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Contract as Emergency Law 
Xuan-Thao Nguyen† 
 Abstract: This Article offers a new perspective of contract law as 
emergency law. Doctrines of impossibility, supervening events, force majeure, 
and good faith performance are core principles resiliently allowing parties to 
address contract nonperformance under state of emergency crises. 
Comparatively, China prefers drastic measures to confront contract 
nonperformance problems by issuing Certificates of Force Majeure, permitting 
Chinese companies to escape contract liability and forfeiting the resiliency of 
contract law as emergency law. The Article argues that the pandemic reaffirms 
the role of contract law as emergency law and urges governments to solidify the 
freedom to contract. 
 Cite as: Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Contract as Emergency Law, 30 WASH. 
INT’L L.J. 420 (2021). 
INTRODUCTION 
COVID-19 brought a state of emergency to the United 
States and the world. President Donald Trump signed several 
Executive Orders. At the state level, governors issued their 
Executive Orders to respond to the emergency.1 Legislatively, 
Congress addressed the COVID-19 pandemic by passing financial 
packages to rescue the economy from precipitous freefall. For 
instance, the Coronavirus Aid, Relief and Economic Security Act 
 
†  Gerald L. Bepko Chair in Law, Director of the Center for Intellectual Property 
& Innovation, Indiana University McKinney School of Law. Special thanks to Michelle 
Swinney and Malissa Magiera for their valuable assistance. Thank you to my Chinese 
students for their research assistance. I dedicate the series of law review articles on 
Contracts and COVID-19 to my 1L students at the University of Washington School of 
Law and Indiana University McKinney School of Law. 
1  See Benjamin Della Rocca et al., State Emergency Authorities to Address 
COVID-19, LAWFARE (May 4, 2020, 3:03 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/state-
emergency-authorities-address-COVID-19 (providing state by state analysis of emergency 
laws and responses); COVID-19 Emergency Powers and Constitutional Limits, AKIN 
GUMP (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.akingump.com/en/news-insights/COVID-19-
emergency-powers-and-constitutional-limits.html (identifying federal authority, state 
authority, and various constitutional limits on due process and the takings clause when 
governments force a business to close, commandeer a business or factory, or confiscate a 
private property); see also ANNA PRICE & LOUIS MYERS, LIBR. OF CONG., UNITED STATES: 
FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO COVID-19 (2020), 
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/COVID-19-responses/federal-state-local-responses.pdf 
(detailing the various responses from governments). 
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(CARES Act) enacted on March 27, 2020, protects renters in low 
income housing properties and tenants in units and buildings 
receiving federally backed mortgages from evictions.2 The federal 
moratorium lasted 120 days until August 23, 2020, and was later 
extended to June 30, 2021.3 Cities and local governments also 
extended protection to renters through emergency orders and 
ordinances.4 Of the emergency laws invoked, none addressed the 
millions of cases concerning contract nonperformance due to the 
government shutdown, shelter-in-place, and social distancing 
orders by governors in forty-three states.5 As infection and death 
tolls continued to rise, businesses closed, and the economy 
faltered, parties in contractual agreements faced an unprecedented 
crisis. These parties could not perform their obligations, which 
may cause them to breach their contracts and face substantial 
damages. 
This Article offers a critique of state of emergency laws 
exposing how they are inadequate in ameliorating the massive 
contract nonperformance problems.6 The Article turns to 
 
2  See Ann O’Connell, Emergency Bans on Evictions and Other Tenant 
Protections Related to Coronavirus, NOLO (last updated Apr. 26, 2021), https://www.no
lo.com/evictions-ban (stating that the CDC’s Agency Orders extends the residential 
eviction ban until at least March 31, 2021); Emma Platoff & Juan Pablo Garnham, Eviction 
Proceedings and Debt Collections Can Resume This Month, Texas Supreme Court Order
s, TEX. TRIB. (May 14, 2020, 8:00 PM), https://www.texastribune.org/2020/05/14/texas-
evictions-debt-collections-resume-may-moratoriums-lifted/ (discussing the federal 
moratorium does not apply to tenants who do not reside in buildings with federally backed 
mortgages and that they will face evictions starting May 26). 
3  See id. 
4  Protections for Texas Renters: COVID-19, UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS SCHOOL OF 
LAW, https://sites.utexas.edu/covid19relief/tenant-protections/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2021) 
(listing cities with emergency orders and emergency ordinances to assist renters). 
5  See Rachel Holliday Smith, Debt Collectors Freeze Funds of New Yorkers 
Struggling in Pandemic, CITY (May 1, 2020, 11:53 PM), https://thecity.nyc/2020/05/debt-
collectors-freeze-funds-of-struggling-new-yorkers.html. 
6  As a nation, we are conditioned to think of emergencies as they related to 
national security and natural disasters crises. See, e.g., J. Benton Heath, The New National 
Security Challenge to the Economic Order, 129 YALE L. J. 1020 (2020); Mark P. Nevitt, 
On Environmental Law, Climate Change, & National Security Law, 44 HARV. ENV’T L. 
REV. 321 (2020); Elizabeth Trujillo, An Introduction to Trade and National Security: New 
Concepts of National Security in a Time of Economic Uncertainty, 30 DUKE J. COMPAR. & 
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normative contract laws’ doctrines of impossibility, supervening 
events, frustration of purpose, force majeure, and duty to perform 
in good faith, as evidence of how contract law functions as 
emergency law. The resilience of contract law doctrines, however, 
in the face of a pandemic, may be insufficient. The Article looks 
beyond the U.S. border for a radical response implemented by 
China for further insights. 
In response to the state of emergency, China adopted a 
novel approach to address the private contracts’ problem.7 The 
government declared, upon an application by the contracting party 
for force majeure certificate, that contract performance is excused 
as impossible due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Consequently, the 
nonperforming party is not in breach and can escape damages. As 
China is the center of the global supply chain, thousands of 
companies execute contractual agreements with international 
partners worldwide. Instead of allowing parties to adhere to 
private business ordering to decide for themselves or avail to the 
judicial system for recourse in breach of contract disputes, China’s 
emergency approach allowed companies to invoke 5,600 contracts 
with a total value of $72.47 billion.8  
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I discusses 
emergency laws’ framework and specific emergency laws 
invoked during the COVID-19 pandemic. Part II focuses on 
contract problems under the state of emergency caused by the 
pandemic. Part III explains contract law doctrines that solve 
arising problems during the state of emergency. Part IV examines 
and critiques the Chinese government’s approach to uphold 
thousands of contracts in the international supply chain network. 
The Article concludes with observations for future contracts to 
adequately address pandemic-related supervening events that 
would wreak havoc to the daily functions of a normal economy. 
 
INT’L L. 211 (2020); Craig Martin, Atmospheric Intervention? The Climate Change Crisis 
and the Jus Ad Bellum Regime, 45 COLUM. J. ENV’T L. 331 (2020); Amy L. Stein, A 
Statutory National Security President, 70 FLA. L. REV. 1183 (2018).  
7  China Force Majeure Certificate Issuance Pass 5,600 Amid Virus Outbreak - 
Trade Body, REUTERS (Mar. 11, 2020, 7:53 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/health-
coronavirus-china-forcemajeure/china-force-majeure-certificate-issuance-pass-5600-
amid-virus-outbreak-trade-body-idUSL4N2B43CK. 
8  See id.  
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I. EMERGENCY LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES 
Emergency laws are legislation referring to a state of 
emergency empowering governments to take actions or impose 
policies that governments ordinarily would not be authorized to 
implement.9 That means exigent circumstances must be present 
for governments to declare a state of emergency. Upon the 
declaration, governments can invoke specific powers in response 
to the multiple crises stemming from an emergency.10 
A. Emergency Law Framework 
Circumstances that necessitate a government to declare a 
state of emergency generally include natural disasters, civil 
unrests, armed conflicts, and medical or public health crises.11 
With respect to the legal framework for the declaration, there are 
three different ways the federal government can declare a state of 
 
9  In the words of Justice Pound, concurred by Justice Cardozo, emergency laws 
are always present. See People ex rel. Durham Realty Corp. v. La Fetra, 130 N.E. 601, 606 
(N.Y. 1921) (“Emergency laws in time of peace are uncommon but not unknown. 
Wholesale disaster, financial panic, the aftermath of war, earthquake, pestilence, famine, 
and fire, a combination of men or the force of circumstances may, as the alternative of 
confusion or chaos, demand the enactment of laws that would be thought arbitrary under 
normal conditions. Although emergency cannot become the source of power, and although 
the Constitution cannot be suspended in any complication of peace or war, an emergency 
may afford a reason for putting forth a latent governmental power already enjoyed but not 
previously exercised.”). 
10  Scholars often discuss national security crisis and abrogation of civil liberties 
when governments invoke specific powers to response to emergencies. See, e.g., RICHARD 
A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL 
EMERGENCY (2006); Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating Emergencies, 
56 STAN. L. REV. 605 (2003); Lauren Gilbert, When Democracy Dies Behind Closed 
Doors: The First Amendment and ‘Special Interest’ Hearings, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 741, 
741 (2003) (“The strength of this country's commitment to civil liberties is most often 
tested in times of war or other national emergencies.”); David Greenberg, Lincoln's 
Crackdown, SLATE (Nov. 30, 2001, 11:58 AM), http://www.slate.com/id/2059132 
(detailing Abraham Lincoln's suspension of habeas corpus). 
11  A federal court has defined a state of emergency as “the condition that exists 
whenever, during times of public crisis, disaster, rioting, catastrophe, or similar public 
emergency, public safety authorities are unable to maintain public order or afford adequate 
protection for lives or property, or whenever the occurrence of any such condition is 
imminent.” United States v. Chalk, 441 F.2d 1277, 1280 (4th Cir. 1971). 
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emergency.12 
First, the President possesses the authority to declare a 
national emergency under the National Emergencies Act (NEA).13 
The NEA imposes procedural requirements on the President to 
declare a national emergency.14 Congress can limit the President’s 
emergency authority if it gathers necessary votes to overturn a 
veto. For example, on February 15, 2019, President Trump 
invoked the NEA to issue Proclamation 9844 which declares a 
“National Emergency Concerning the Southern Border of the 
United States.”15 Both the House and the Senate voted to overturn 
the President’s declaration but failed to obtain sufficient votes to 
override the veto.16  
Second, the Secretary of Health & Human Services 
(HHS) possesses the power to declare a national public health 
emergency. The Public Health Act, 42 U.S.C. §247d, empowers 
the HHS Secretary with that authority. The Secretary may 
determine that “a disease or disorder presents a public health 
emergency” or “a public health emergency, including significant 
 
12  There is another legal framework for the President to declare a national 
emergency pursuant to 22 U.S.C. § 2318(a)(1) (“(A)n unforeseen emergency exists which 
requires immediate military assistance to a foreign country or international organization; 
and (B) the emergency requirement cannot be met under the authority of the Arms Export 
Control Act [22 U.S.C §§ 2751 et seq.] or any other law except this section.”). For purposes 
of this Article, only three emergency frameworks are in discussion. See also James G. 
Hodge, Jr., & Kim Weidenaar, Public Health Emergencies as Threats to National Security, 
9 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 81, 82–83 (2017) (identifying relevant laws authorizing 
the President to declare a state of emergency and the Secretary of the Department of Health 
and Human Services to declare a national public health emergency). 
13  50 U.S.C. §§ 1601–51. 
14  50 U.S.C. § 1621(a) (“With respect to Acts of Congress authorizing the 
exercise, during the period of a national emergency, of any special or extraordinary power, 
the President is authorized to declare such national emergency. Such proclamation shall 
immediately be transmitted to the Congress and published in the Federal Register.”); Kim 
Lane Scheppele, Small Emergencies, 40 GA. L. REV. 835, 847 (2006) (“The National 
Emergencies Act is the blanket statute that covers a myriad of separate grants of 
congressional power to the President to be used when he deems there is an emergency.”). 
15  Geoffrey A. Manne & Seth Weinberger, Trust the Process: How the National 
Emergency Act Threatens Marginalized Populations and the Constitution—and What to 
Do About It, 44 HARBINGER 95, 95 (2020). 
16  See id. (noting “the emergency remains in place” as Congress failed to override 
the veto). 
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outbreaks of infectious disease or bioterrorist attacks, otherwise 
exists.”17 In addition, instead of being the first to declare a public 
health emergency, the Secretary could follow a presidential memo 
instructing the Secretary to declare a national public health 
emergency or a presidential proclamation declaring a national 
emergency with respect to a national public health crisis. For 
example, the “President Memo Combatting the National Drug 
Demand and Opioid Crisis” that was released on October 26, 2017 
instructed the HHS Secretary to declare a public health emergency 
to combat the opioid crisis.18 Likewise, the Presidential 
Proclamation 8443 declared a national emergency with respect to 
the 2009 H1N1 flu pandemic on October 23, 2009.19 Upon the 
declaration of a national public health emergency, the Secretary 
can make grants; provide awards for expenses; enter into 
contracts; and conduct and support investigations into the cause, 
treatment, or prevention of the disease.20 The Secretary can also 
waive or modify requirements during the emergency.21 
Lastly, the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief & 
Emergency Assistance Act enables a governor to petition the 
President for a declaration of a major disaster or emergency.22 A 
 
17  42 U.S.C. § 247d; See also Public Health Emergency Declarations, 
DEPARTMENT OF HEATH & HUMAN SERVICES, (Apr. 16, 2021), https://www.phe.gov/em
ergency/news/healthactions/phe/Pages/default.aspx (listing all Public Health Emergency 
Declarations). 
18  A Guide to Emergency Powers and Their Use, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE 
(Apr. 24, 2020), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/guide-
emergency-powers-and-their-use.  
19  Proclamation 8443–Declaration of a National Emergency with Respect to the 
2009 H1N1 Influenza Pandemic, AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Oct. 24, 2009), 
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/proclamation-8443-declaration-national-
emergency-with-respect-the-2009-h1n1-influenza. 
20  See id. 
21  Waiver or Modification of Requirements Under Section 1135 of the Social 
Security Act, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES (Oct. 27, 2009), 
https://www.phe.gov/emergency/news/healthactions/section1135/Documents/1135Waive
rSigned_H1N1.pdf  
22  42 U.S.C. § 5170. The Act’s predecessors were both known as the “Disaster 
Relief Act,” enacted in 1950 and 1974. The framework under the Stafford Act allows state 
and federal government to address bio attacks and other disasters. See Barry Kellman, 
Responding to Biological Attacks, 20 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 1, 11 (2018) (stating 
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governor submits such a petition upon a finding that a “disaster is 
of such severity and magnitude that an effective response is 
beyond the capabilities of the State and affected local 
governments and that Federal assistance is necessary.”23 
Presidents have declared national emergencies under this Act 
upon governors’ requests on an average of nine times per year.24 
Each of these tools are options for the federal government 
to take swift action during emergencies. Absent these laws, 




that responses to bio-attacks and other catastrophe are “part of the normal National 
Response Framework.”). 
23  42 U.S.C. § 5170. 42 U.S.C. § 5122 (defining an emergency under this chapter 
as "any occasion or instance for which, in the determination of the President, Federal 
assistance is needed to supplement State and local efforts and capabilities to save lives and 
to protect property and public health and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a 
catastrophe in any part of the United States.”). Also, a major disaster under this chapter is 
defined as "any natural catastrophe (including any hurricane, tornado, storm, high water, 
wind driven [sic] water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, 
mudslide, snowstorm, or drought), or, regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion, in 
any part of the United States, which in the determination of the President causes damage 
of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance under this chapter 
to supplement the efforts and available resources of States, local governments, and disaster 
relief organizations in alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused thereby” 
Id. Illustratively, Hurricane Katrina in 2005 caused Louisiana governor Kathleen Blanco 
to request that President Bush to declare a federal state of emergency for Louisiana, 
activating federal assistance and federal troops to rescue people and protect property. 
Mitchell F. Crusto, State of Emergency: An Emergency Constitution Revisited, 61 LOY. L. 
REV. 471, 482 (2015); see Toni M. Massaro & Ellen Elizabeth Brooks, Flint of Outrage, 
93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 155, 168–69 (2017) (stating that in response to the Flint’s 
contaminated water crisis, on January 14, 2016, Governor Rick Snyder “declared a state of 
emergency and requested federal aid. On January 16, 2016, President Barack Obama 
declared a state of national emergency in Flint. On January 21, 2016, the EPA issued an 
Emergency Order pursuant to the SWDA compelling state officials to take specific steps 
to assure the safety of the public water system.”). 
24  A Guide to Emergency Powers and Their Use, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE 
(Apr. 24, 2020), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/guide-
emergency-powers-and-their-use; see Bruce R. Lindsay & Francis X. McCarthy, CONG. 
RSCH. SERV., R42702, STAFFORD ACT DECLARATIONS 1953-2014: TRENDS, ANALYSES, 
AND IMPLICATIONS FOR CONGRESS 7 (2015). 
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B. Emergency Law Invoked During COVID-19 
During the early months of 2020, as COVID-19 
tormented the nation by shutting down the economy, the HHS 
Secretary first declared a national public health emergency under 
the Public Health Act.25 The President then proclaimed a national 
emergency and issued three executive orders pursuant to the NEA.  
The first person documented with the COVID-19 
infection in the United States occurred on January 20, 2020.26 The 
viral contagion first detected in Wuhan, China, quickly 
transmitted through symptomatic and asymptomatic individuals in 
213 countries and territories around the world.27 The World Health 
Organization declared COVID-19 a pandemic on March 11, 
2020.28 As the news reports on COVID-19 spreading and killing 
infected individuals in Wuhan, governments in different countries 
responded with different measures.29 In the United States, under 
the emergency law framework, the HHS Secretary declared a 
national public health emergency as the result of COVID-19 on 
 
25  Press Release, Secretary Azar Declares Public Health Emergency for United 
States for 2019 Novel Coronavirus (Jan. 31, 2020), https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/202
0/01/31/secretary-azar-declares-public-health-emergency-us-2019-novel-
coronavirus.html. 
26  See Michelle L. Holshue et al., First Case of 2019 Novel Coronavirus in the 
United States, 382 NEW ENG. J. OF MED. 929 (Mar. 5, 2020), https://www.nejm.org/doi/f
ull/10.1056/NEJMoa2001191; Karen Weise et al., Why Washington State? How Did It 
Start? Questions Answered on the U.S. Coronavirus Outbreak, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2020
), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/04/us/coronavirus-in-washington-state.html. 
27  See generally Countries Where Covid-19 Has Spread, WORLDOMETER (Apr. 
28, 2021), https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/countries-where-coronavirus-has-
spread/ (as of June 14, 2021, the world witnessed 176,895,871 confirmed Covid-19 cases, 
along with 3,822,394 deaths). 
28  See Timeline: WHO’s Covid-19 Response, WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/interactive-timeline 
(last visited Feb. 27, 2021); Press Release, New ICD-10-CM Code for the 2019 Novel 
Coronavirus (COVID-19), Ctr. for Disease Control & Prevention (Mar. 18, 2020), 
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/icd/Announcement-New-ICD-code-for-coronavirus-3-18-
2020.pdf. 
29  See Helen Regan et al., January 29 Coronavirus News, CNN (Jan. 29, 2020, 
11:44 P.M.), https://www.cnn.com/asia/live-news/coronavirus-outbreak-01-29-20-intl-
hnk/index.html (explaining how Japan, Malaysia, China, and South Korea addressed the 
spread of Covid-19 in the early months). 
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January 31, 2020.30  
The HHS Secretary subsequently renewed the national 
public health emergency declaration on April 21, 2020.31 The last 
time the HHS Secretary made a similar declaration due to a viral 
outbreak was during the H1N1 pandemic.32 Upon declaration, the 
HHS Secretary may waive or modify the application of health care 
items and services furnished by health care providers, 
certifications, licensure requirements, sanctions, and other 
provisions as necessary to supply public health services during the 
emergency period.33 
By March 13, 2020, COVID-19’s devastation in the 
United States required a new response: President Trump issued 
Proclamation 9994, which declared a national emergency 
 
30  See U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services, Determination that a Public 
Health Emergency Exists, (Jan. 31, 2020), https://www.phe.gov/emergency/news/healtha
ctions/phe/Pages/2019-nCoV.aspx (“As a result of confirmed cases of 2019 Novel 
Coronavirus (2019-nCoV), on this date and after consultation with public health officials 
as necessary, I, Alex M. Azar II, Secretary of Health and Human Services, pursuant to the 
authority vested in me under section 319 of the Public Health Service Act, do hereby 
determine that a public health emergency exists and has existed since January 27, 2020, 
nationwide.”). President Trump, on March 18, 2020, issued Executive Order 13,909 to 
delegate the HHS Secretary the prioritization and allocation authority under section 101 of 
the Act with respect to health and medical resources needed to respond to the spread of 
COVID-19. See Exec. Order No.13,909, 85 Fed. Reg. 16,227 (Mar. 18, 2020). On March 
23, 2020, Trump signed Executive Order 13,910 to delegate to the HHS Secretary the 
authority to prevent hoarding of health and medical resources necessary to respond to the 
spread of COVID-19 within the United States. See Exec. Order No. 13,910, 85 Fed. Reg. 
17,001 (Mar. 23, 2020). 
31  See U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services, Renewal of Determination that a 
Public Health Emergency Exists, (Apr. 21, 2020), https://www.phe.gov/emergency/news/
healthactions/phe/Pages/covid19-21apr2020.aspx (“As a result of the continued 
consequences of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) (formerly called 2019 Novel 
Coronavirus (2019-nCoV)) pandemic, on this date and after consultation with public health 
officials as necessary, I, Alex M. Azar II, Secretary of Health and Human Services, 
pursuant to the authority vested in me under section 319 of the Public Health Service Act, 
do hereby renew, effective April 26, 2020, my January 31, 2020, determination that a 
public health emergency exists and has existed since January 27, 2020, nationwide.”). 
32  On April 26, 2009, HHS Secretary declared a public health emergency under 
section 319 of the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. 247d, in response to the 2009 
H1N1 influenza virus. The Secretary then renewed that declaration twice, on July 24, 2009, 
and October 1, 2009. 
33  See 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-5. 
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retroactively as of March 1, 2020.34 Generally, most presidential 
proclamations are aimed at those outside the government 
containing neither force nor effect of law because they are merely 
ceremonial in nature.35 However, with the proclamation to declare 
a national emergency, the President may authorize the Secretary 
of the Treasury to prescribe, “the importation free of duty of food, 
clothing, and medical, surgical, and other supplies for use in 
emergency relief work” under the Emergencies statute, 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1318(a).36 Under the Emergencies statute, the Treasury 
Secretary is further authorized to eliminate, consolidate, or 
relocate port of entry, or take any other action that may be 
necessary to respond to a specific threat.37 Also, the statute 
authorizes the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection to close ports of entry as necessary to “respond to the 
 
34  Proclamation No. 9994, 85 Fed. Reg. 15,337 (Mar. 13, 2020) (invoked in 
response to the spread of the novel coronavirus). See Pimentel-Estrada v. Barr, 458 
F.Supp.3d 1226, 1233 (W.D. Wash. 2020) (including Proclamation No. 9994 along with 
state and local governments’ “stay home” orders). 
35  Executive Order, Proclamation, or Executive Memorandum?, LIBR. OF CONG., 
https://guides.loc.gov/executive-orders/order-proclamation-memorandum (last visited 
Feb. 27, 2021). 
36  See 19 U.S.C. § 1318(a). 
37  See 19 U.S.C. § 1318(b) (providing that “. . . the Secretary of the Treasury, 
when necessary to respond to a national emergency declared under the National 
Emergencies Act . . . or to a specific threat to human life or national interests” is authorized 
to take additional actions on a temporary basis. Secretary of the Treasury may eliminate, 
consolidate, or relocate any office or port of entry of the Customs Service; modify hours 
of service, alter services rendered at any location, or reduce the number of employees at 
any location; or take any other action that may be necessary to respond directly to the 
national emergency or specific threat. Id. The Treasury Secretary works in consultation 
with the Secretary of Department of Homeland Security who then limited travel to prevent 
the spread of Covid-19. See Exec. Order No. 13,916, 85 Fed. Reg. 22,951 (Apr. 23, 2020) 
(the Treasury “Secretary shall consult with the Secretary of Homeland Security or his 
designee before exercising, as invoked and made available under this order, any of the 
authority set forth in section 1318(a) of title 19, United States Code.”). The Secretary of 
Homeland Security later extended the travel limitations until May 20, 2020. See 
Notification of Temporary Travel Restrictions Applicable to Land Ports of Entry and 
Ferries Service Between the United States and Canada, 85 Fed. Reg. 31,059 (May 22, 
2020). For the Travel Restrictions between the United States and Mexico due to Covid-19, 
see Notification of Temporary Travel Restrictions Applicable to Land Ports of Entry and 
Ferries Service Between the United States and Mexico, 85 Fed. Reg. 16,547 (Mar. 20, 
2020). 
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specific threat to human life or national interests.”38 Indeed, the 
Department of Homeland Security invoked the Emergencies 
statute to limit travels at the U.S. land ports of entry with Canada 
and Mexico, in response to the spread of the novel coronavirus.39 
After the proclamation of COVID-19 as a national 
emergency, on March 27, 2020, President Trump signed 
Executive Orders 13,911 and 13,912, invoking his authority under 
the National Emergencies Act.40 In Executive Order 13,911, the 
President delegated “additional authority” under the Defense 
Production Act with respect to health and medical resources, such 
as personal protective equipment and ventilators, to respond to the 
COVID-19 spread. Specifically, President Trump delegated the 
authority “to guarantee loans by private institutions, make loans, 
make provision for purchases and commitments to purchase, and 
take additional actions to create, maintain, protect, expand, and 
restore domestic industrial based capabilities to produce such 
resources.”41 Further, the President delegated the authority “to 
enable greater cooperation among private businesses in expanding 
production of and distributing such resources . . . and to provide 
for the making of voluntary agreements and plans of action by the 
private sector.”42 
For Executive Order 13,912, President Trump invoked a 
national emergency authority to order the “Selected Reserve and 
Certain Members of the Individual Ready Reserve of the Armed 
Forces” to active duty in response to the spread of the novel 
 
38  See 19 U.S.C. § 1318(b)(2). 
39  On March 18, 2020, the U.S. and Canadian governments announced the closure 
of the international border to nonessential travel due to the COVID-19 pandemic. See 
Notification of Temporary Travel Restrictions Applicable to Land Ports of Entry and 
Ferries Service Between the United States and Mexico, 85 Fed. Reg. 16,547 (Mar. 20, 
2020). In the announcement of the border closure, the Department of Homeland Security 
noted that, consistent with the President’s declaration of a national emergency, the spread 
of COVID-19 within the U.S. posed a “specific threat to human life or national interests,” 
justifying the travel restrictions under 19 U.S.C. § 1318. Only essential travels are 
permitted. Id. 
40  See Exec. Order No. 13,911, 85 Fed. Reg. 18,403 (Mar. 27, 2020). See also 
Exec. Order No. 13,912, 85 Fed. Reg. 18,407 (Mar. 27, 2020). 
41  Exec. Order No. 13,911, 85 Fed. Reg. 18,403. 
42  Id. 
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coronavirus.43 Also, on April 18, 2020, the President issued 
Executive Order 13,916 to invoke a national emergency in 
providing additional authority to the Secretary of the Treasury in 
response to COVID-19.44 Under this executive order, the Treasury 
Secretary possesses the authority to “temporarily extend 
deadlines” for certain estimated payments that importers were 
“suffering significant financial hardship because of COVID-19.”45 
According to the Temporary Final Rule issued by U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection and the Department of Treasury, importers 
with significant financial hardships relating to merchandise 
entered into the United States between March-April 2020, could 
postpone their payments for duties, taxes, or fees.46 
In summary, at the U.S. national level, in response to the 
COVID-19 pandemic disrupting the nation and causing a 
shutdown of the economy, the President proclaimed a national 
emergency and issued three executive orders pursuant to the NEA. 
The President’s declaration and executive orders came after the 
HHS Secretary declared a national public health emergency.  
At the state level, as of April 6, 2020, governors in forty-
three states issued executive orders to direct stay-at-home or 
shelter-in-place for all with few exemptions.47 About 300 million 
Americans, or more than 90% of the total population, were given 
orders to stay indoors.48 The exemptions covered grocery 
shopping, limited outdoor exercise, and a narrow list of essential 
jobs. Consequently, the entire country abruptly came to a grinding 
halt. 
The breadth of executive action demonstrates how serious 
 
43  See 85 Fed. Reg. 18,407. 
44  See 85 Fed. Reg. 22,951. 
45  Id. 
46  See Temporary Postponement of the Time to Deposit Certain Estimated Duties, 
Taxes, and Fees During the National Emergency Concerning the Novel Coronavirus 
(COVID-19) Outbreak, 85 Fed. Reg. 22,349; see also Richard Newcomb et al., US Takes 
Action to Abate Tariffs and Duties in Wake of COVID-19, DLA PIPER (May 8, 2020), 
https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/publications/2020/05/us-takes-action-to-abate-
tariffs-and-duties-in-wake-of-covid-19/. 
47  See Jason Silverstein, 43 States Now Have Stay-at-Home Orders for 
Coronavirus. These Are the 7 That Don’t, CBS NEWS (Apr. 6, 2020, 7:30 PM), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/stay-at-home-orders-states/.  
48  Id. 
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unprecedented COVID-19 was. A federalist society centralizing 
power in this way exemplifies the unprecedented nature that 
COVID-19 presented. However, none of these executive orders 
addressed what was to come of pre-existing contracts. 
II. CONTRACT PROBLEMS UNDER THE STATE OF EMERGENCY 
COVID-19 upended the United States and the rest of the 
world. As of February 25, 2021, more than 500,000 Americans 
died of COVID-19 since February of 2020, when the first US 
recorded death occurred.49 The contagious virus infected more 
than 28 million people in the United States.50 As businesses either 
remained shut down or struggled to reopen, unemployment filings 
reached over 40 million in March 2020.51 Outside the United 
States, the viral contagion wreaked havoc worldwide and forced 
businesses into deep uncertainty. A United Nations study found 
that “81% of the world workforce of 3.3 billion people 
experienced their place of work fully or partly closed because of 
 
49  See COVID-19 Tracker, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/cases-updates/cases-in-us.html (last visited 
Feb. 28, 2021); see also Thomas Fuller & Mike Baker, Coronavirus Death in California 
Came Weeks Before First Known U.S. Death, N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 2020), https://www.ny
times.com/2020/04/22/us/coronavirus-first-united-states-death.html. 
50  See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, supra note 49; see also 
Coronavirus in the U.S.: Latest Map and Case Count, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2021, 2:36 
P.M.), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/coronavirus-us-cases.html. 
Worldwide, more than 13 million people are infected by Covid-19 as of July 14, 2020, 
reflecting an increase of 10 million people since April 2020. See also Pablo Gutiérrez et 
al., Covid World Map: Which Countries Have the Most Coronavirus Cases and Deaths?, 
THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 25, 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/feb/25/covid-
world-map-which-countries-have-the-most-coronavirus-vaccinations-cases-and-deaths; 
Pimentel-Estrada v. Barr, 458 F.Supp.3d 1226, 1233 (W.D. Wash. 2020) (noting that at the 
end of April 2020 COVID-19 “has so far infected more than 3 million people globally and 
has killed more than 208,000. COVID-19 is ten times deadlier than a severe seasonal 
influenza.”). 
51  See Patricia Cohen, ‘Still Catching Up’: Jobless Numbers May Not Tell Full 
Story, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/28/business/econom
y/coronavirus-unemployment-claims.html (stating that more than 40 million people or one 
out of every four American workers have filed for unemployment benefits); Patricia Cohen, 
Many Jobs May Vanish Forever as Layoffs Mount, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/21/business/economy/coronavirus-unemployment-
claims.html (reporting 38.6 million Americans are without employment in May 2020 and 
42% of those jobs may not return). 
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the outbreak.”52 The pandemic caused unparalleled decline in 
many sectors of the economy.53 The pandemic’s impact, as 
predicted by experts, will lead to “permanent shifts in political and 
economic power in ways that will become apparent only later.”54 
As the United States joined other nations to flatten and 
control the curve of infection and death caused by COVID-19, the 
economy came to a sudden halt.55 Consequently, contract 
 
52  See Coronavirus: Worst Economic Crisis Since 1930s Depression, IMF Says, 
BBC (Apr. 9, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-52236936. 
53  See Sam Meredith, IEA Says the Coronavirus Crisis Has Set in Motion the 
Largest Drop of Global Energy Investment in History, CNBC (May 27, 2020, 9:24 AM ), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/27/coronavirus-iea-expects-historic-fall-in-global-
energy-investment.html (“The International Energy Agency believes the coronavirus 
pandemic has paved the way for the largest decline of global energy investment in history, 
with spending set to plummet in every major sector this year.”); Yen Nee Lee, Global 
Economy May Not Fully Recover from the Coronavirus Crisis by 2021, IMF Chief 
Economist Says, CNBC (Apr. 17, 2020, 12:16 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/17/c
oronavirus-global-economy-may-not-recover-fully-by-2021-imf-says.html; Sergei 
Klebnikov, IMF Warns Coronavirus Will Hurt Global Economy ‘Way Worse’ Than 2008 
Financial Crisis, FORBES (Apr. 3, 2020, 1:50 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/sergeikl
ebnikov/2020/04/03/imf-warns-coronavirus-will-hurt-global-economy-way-worse-than-
2008-financial-crisis/#15f8251f707e. 
54  See John R. Allen et al., How the World Will Look After the Coronavirus 
Pandemic, FOREIGN POLICY (Mar. 20, 2020), https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/03/20/world-
order-after-coroanvirus-pandemic/. 
55  Harry Stevens, Why Outbreaks like Coronavirus Spread Exponentially, and 
How to “Flatten the Curve,” WASH. POST (Mar. 14, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/graphics/2020/world/corona-simulator/. Unfortunately, “the curve has come undone” 
due to lack of national leadership. Opinion: Americans Sacrificed to Flatten the Curve. 
Their Leaders Have Let Them Down., WASH. POST (June 30, 2020), https://www.washin
gtonpost.com/opinions/americans-sacrificed-to-flatten-the-curve-their-leaders-have-let-
them-down/2020/06/30/4c442e72-baf0-11ea-8cf5-9c1b8d7f84c6_story.html (“The nation 
still needs a federal response. The virus is relentless and opportunistic — but the response 
has been patchwork and uneven. Unless that is fixed, we will be doomed to more suffering 
and terrible losses still to come.”). Economically, the United States collapsed and suffered 
a staggering loss. Alan Rappeport & Jim Tankersley, Monthly U.S. Budget Deficit Soared 
to Record $864 Billion in June, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/20
20/07/13/us/politics/budget-deficit-coronavirus.html (reporting the U.S. budget deficit 
grew to a record level “as the federal government pumped huge sums of money into the 
economy to prop up workers and businesses affected by the coronavirus” and the increased 
deficits are the “direct results of the economy’s swift collapse amid the pandemic.”); Annie 
Lowrey, The Second Great Depression, THE ATLANTIC (June 23, 2020), 
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problems escalated. The global supply chain management 
suffered severely because the viral disruption was “not part of 
supplier performance metrics” for many companies; therefore, 
suppliers failed to provide solutions addressing the outbreak.56 
The global supply chain disruption acutely affected local stores in 
the United States, as shelves in stores sat empty, and customers 
waited for arrival of shipments, production stoppages, shortages 
of raw materials and semi-finished goods unfolded in China and 
other countries.57  
Meanwhile, due to government shelter-in-place orders, 
the demands for supplies in many sectors drastically decreased, 
devastating the supply chain ecosystem.58 For example, in the 
automotive sector, “41 of the 44 auto assembly plants in the 
United States closed” by March 26, 2020, propelling many 
automotive suppliers into financial trouble, including “Aptiv, one 
of the world’s largest automotive suppliers, announced that it 
would draw down its entire $1.4 billion credit facility.”59 Another 
example is the food supply chain, which was severely disrupted 
by the pandemic, creating “shocks” to both supply and demand 
 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/06/second-great-depression/613360/ 
(“Three months ago, the pandemic and ensuing shelter-in-place orders caused mass job 
loss unlike anything in recent American history. A virtual blizzard settled on top of the 
country and froze everyone in place. Nearly 40 percent of low-wage workers lost their jobs 
in March. More than 40 million people lost their jobs in March, April, or May.”). 
56  See Thomas Y. Choi et al., Coronavirus Is a Wake-Up Call for Supply Chain 
Management, HARVARD BUS. REV. (Mar. 27, 2020), https://hbr.org/2020/03/coronavirus-
is-a-wake-up-call-for-supply-chain-management. 
57  Coronavirus and Supply Chain Disruption: What Firms Can Learn, 
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Mar. 17, 2020), https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/
veeraraghavan-supply-chain/ (“Long stretches of empty supermarket shelves and shortages 
of essential supplies are only the visible impacts to consumers of the global supply chain 
disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Unseen are the production stoppages in 
locations across China and other countries and the shortages of raw materials, sub-
assemblies and finished goods that make up the backstory of the impact.”); see also Adnan 
Seric et al., WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM (Apr. 27, 2020), Managing COVID-19: How the 
Pandemic Disrupts Global Value Chains, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/04/covi
d-19-pandemic-disrupts-global-value-chains/. 
58  Tom Linton & Bindiya Vakil, It’s up to Manufacturers to Keep Their Suppliers 
Afloat, HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 14, 2020), https://hbr.org/2020/04/its-up-to-manufacturers-
to-keep-their-suppliers-afloat. 
59  See id. 
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sides.60 Giant companies like Walmart that leverage sophisticated 
algorithms, still struggled to manage their supply chains because 
COVID-19 “ha[d] thrown off the digital program that helps them 
predict how many diapers and garden hoses they need to keep on 
the shelves.”61 In other words, the supply chain disruptions meant 
parties could not perform in accordance to the terms of their 
contracts because the agreement did not include provisions 
anticipating the changes caused by COVID-19.62 
At a more granular level, contract problems involving 
individuals rose in staggering number. As students became 
unhappy with online learning environments, they brought contract 
class actions against public and private universities across the 
country.63 Dentists, facing rapid losses in their practices because 
 
60  See Ravi Anupindi, COVID-19 Shocks Food Supply Chain, Spurs Creativity 
and Search for Resiliency, MICH. BUS. REV. (Apr. 29, 2020), https://news.umich.edu/cov
id-19-shocks-food-supply-chain-spurs-creativity-and-search-for-resiliency/ (discussing 
how COVID-19 has created multiple shocks to these supply chains deemed “demand” and 
“supply” shocks); see also Melissa Repko & Amelia Lucas, The Meat Supply Chain Is 
Broken. Here’s Why Shortages Are Likely to Last During the Coronavirus Pandemic, 
CNBC (May 7, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/07/heres-why-meat-shortages-are-
likely-to-last-during-the-pandemic.html (identifying various pressures caused by Covid-19 
on the meat supply chain in the United States that creates the meat shortages). 
61  See Nicole Wetsman, The Algorithms Big Companies Use to Manage Their 
Supply Chains Don’t Work During Pandemics, VERGE (Apr. 27, 2020, 1:25 PM), 
https://www.theverge.com/2020/4/27/21238229/algorithms-supply-chain-model-
pandemic-disruption-amazon-walmart. 
62  See generally Tiffany D. Presley & Jamal Abdulrasheed, Force Majeure: 
Navigating Coronavirus Supply Chain Disruptions, NAT. L. REV. (Mar. 10, 2020), 
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/force-majeure-navigating-coronavirus-supply-
chain-disruptions (providing an analysis of force majeure in supply chain contracts that 
require buyers and supplier to determine: “1) what events constitute a force majeure event 
under the contract, 2) should a qualifying event occur, does the provision totally relieve a 
party of an obligation to perform a contractual obligation or merely suspend or delay of 
performance until the conclusion of the force majeure event? 3) whether either or both 
parties are required to mitigate losses, and 4) whether counterparty notice is required and 
the form of such notice.”). 
63  See Michelle G. Kurilla, Student Files Class Action Lawsuit Against Harvard 
Following Coronavirus Closure, HARV. CRIMSON (May 22, 2020), https://www.thecrims
on.com/article/2020/5/22/harvard-coronavirus-class-action/ (the student’s class action 
alleges that Harvard “provided inadequate education after sending students home due to 
the COVID-19 outbreak”); Karen Sloan, 'Subpar in Every Aspect': Harvard Law Student 
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patients were too afraid to visit dental offices for fear of 
contracting the viral disease, sought to enforce insurance policy 
contract terms to cover their losses by filing contract class actions 
against insurance companies.64 Families of loved ones in nursing 
homes suffered incalculable losses, felt the despair, and brought 
torts and contract actions against nursing homes as death tolls in 
those facilities constituted the largest segment of elderly people 
negatively impacted by the disease.65 Employees, independent 
contractors, speakers, airline passengers, cruise passengers, 
festival ticketholders, among others, filed contract actions against 
 
Sues Over Online Classes, LAW.COM (June 23, 2020, 3:08 PM), 
https://www.law.com/2020/06/23/subpar-in-every-aspect-harvard-law-student-sues-over-
online-classes/?slreturn=20200614161231 (noting that at least 100 universities have faced 
lawsuits brought by students to seek tuition reimbursements amid the pandemic); Andrew 
Keshner, At Least 100 Lawsuits Have Been Filed by Students Seeking College Refunds — 




64  See Anne Bucher, Dental Clinic Class Action Lawsuit Filed Over Covid-19 
Losses, TOP CLASS ACTIONS (Apr. 23, 2020), https://ca.topclassactions.com/lawsuit-
settlements/lawsuit-news/dental-clinic-class-action-lawsuit-filed-over-covid-19-losses/ 
(noting the class members “paid for business interruption insurance in the expectation that 
the defendant would honour its contractual obligations in good faith if and when an 
unforeseen and unintentional occurrence were to take place resulting in an interruption of 
business”); Bill Rankin, Cobb Dentist Files Class-Action Suit over Lost Coronavirus 
Business, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (May 9, 2020); https://www.ajc.com/news/local/cobb-
dentist-files-class-action-suit-over-lost-coronavirus-
business/LdcgmYmpKQu1nxG6jRLJEM/; Erin Shaak, Dentist Claims Farmers, Foremost 
Insurance Cos. Wrongfully Denied Business Interruption Claim Amid COVID-19, 
CLASSACTION.ORG (June 16, 2020), https://www.classaction.org/news/dentist-claims-
farmers-foremost-insurance-cos-wrongfully-denied-business-interruption-claim-amid-
covid-19. 
65  See Matt Hamilton, Her Father Had COVID-19 for Weeks. The Nursing Home 
Told Her the Day Before He Died, L.A. TIMES (July 9, 2020, 5:00 A.M. P.T.), 
https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-07-09/her-father-had-covid-19-for-weeks-
the-nursing-home-told-her-the-night-before-he-died (chronicling the alleged conduct that 
caused nursing home resident death and noting that 3,176 nursing home residents died of 
Covid-19); Abigail Abrams, 'A License for Neglect.' Nursing Homes Are Seeking — and 
Winning — Immunity Amid the Coronavirus Pandemic, TIME (May 14, 2020, 2:40 P.M. 
E.D.T.) (reporting on lawsuits brought against nursing homes “for neglect, abuse and 
wrongful death” during the pandemic). 
JUNE 2021 CONTRACT AS EMERGENCY LAW 437 
businesses for canceling events, projects, flights, and cruises due 
to COVID-19.66 In these suits, claimants asserted breach of 
contract and unjust enrichment,67claiming that the businesses 
failed to pay or failed to refund as promised.68  
Overall, the COVID-19 pandemic rendered parties unable 
to fulfill contracts.69 Lawsuits related to nonperformance, 
suspension, breach, and damages in connection with COVID-19 
are now entering court dockets across the United States.70 Parties 
 
66  See Diana Fassbender et al., COVID-19 Class Action Lawsuits: Defending 
Against Alleged Breach of Contract Over Decisions During Uncertain Times, LAW.COM 
(Apr. 20, 2020, 4:31 P.M.), https://www.law.com/corpcounsel/2020/04/20/covid-19-class-
action-lawsuits-defending-against-alleged-breach-of-contract-over-decisions-during-
uncertain-times/ (identifying contract cases “have been filed against airlines for refund 
claims arising out of flight cancellations; against ticket sellers and marketplaces for refunds 
following cancelled events; against gyms and fitness facilities for the charging of monthly 
membership fees while facilities are closed; and against universities and other facilities 
providing room and board.”). 
67  See COVID-19 Class Actions: Refund Disputes Rage Over Membership Fees 
& Event Tickets, CROWELL MORING (Apr. 17, 2020), https://www.crowell.com/NewsEve
nts/AlertsNewsletters/all/COVID-19-Class-Actions-Refund-Disputes-Rage-Over-
Membership-Fees-Event-Tickets. 
68  See Bob Sechler, Coronavirus in Austin: SXSW Sued Over No-Refund Policy 
After Cancellation, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN (Apr. 25, 2020), 
https://www.statesman.com/business/20200425/coronavirus-in-austin-sxsw-sued-over-
no-refund-policy-after-cancellation. 
69  See generally Samuel Lanier Felker & Matthew S. Mulqueen, Tidal Wave of 
COVID-19 Lawsuits on the Way, BAKER DONELSON (Apr. 21, 2020), 
https://www.bakerdonelson.com/tidal-wave-of-covid-19-lawsuits-on-the-way (“As the 
‘new normal’ sinks in with social distancing and government-imposed shutdowns, some 
businesses are struggling to stay afloat. Now, many are about to be slammed with a tidal 
wave of litigation as consumers and injured parties seek compensation for COVID-related 
losses. A recent flurry of class action and other mass filings gives us a hint of what lies 
ahead—and they appear to be only the tip of the iceberg.”). 
70  See Class Action Litigation Related to COVID-19: Filed and Anticipated Cases, 
PIERCE ATWOOD (Nov. 9, 2020), https://www.pierceatwood.com/alerts/class-action-
litigation-related-covid-19-filed-and-anticipated-cases (providing lists of cases filed 
against “airlines seeking the refund of payments for cancelled flights based on breach of 
contract,” against “fitness clubs, ski resorts, amusement parks, and other organizations 
seeking the refund of season passes and membership fees based on breach of contract, 
consumer protection, and other theories,” against “nursing and residential care facilities 
[that] may face class action litigation based in contract or tort relating to their response to 
the COVID-19 pandemic,” against insurers for “breach of contract and declaratory 
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must wait for years to obtain results through the judicial system as 
none of the emergency laws address contract crisis caused by 
COVID-19. Based on the experience the world now has with the 
COVID-19 pandemic, parties should from this point forward 
include provisions addressing the alternatives that will take place 
in the event of a future pandemic. 
III. CONTRACT LAW AND STATE OF EMERGENCY 
The contemporary debate on the law of contracts centers 
on transactional justice—who gets what and whether the deal is 
fair.71 Contracts scholars often focus on freedom of contracts, 
efficiency, social practice and social trust to justify different 
outcomes, but not on whether transactions are fair.72 The debate, 
however, does not frame contract law as the law of emergency. 
Generally, we do not turn to the government to solve 
private ordering problems regardless of whether or not a nation is 
in a state of emergency. The unprecedented magnitude of the 
COVID-19 crisis generates two different approaches to the 
unsurmountable contract problems. On the one hand, parties 
utilize existing contract law doctrines to solve COVID-19 related 
nonperformance problems. On the other hand, government 
intervention solves the contract nonperformance problems and 
absolves damages, as seen in China. Preferably, governmental 
intervention should not be used, as it creates uncertainty in future 
contract negotiations. Additionally, the government is not as 
familiar with the goals of the contract as the parties to the contract. 
Perhaps most importantly, government intervention undermines 
the parties’ freedom to contract. 
This section focuses on the first approach by evaluating 
how contract law’s doctrines—force majeure, impossibility, and 
duty of performing in good faith—address contract issues during 
a state of emergency. 
 
judgment claims against insurers for failure to cover losses from forced business closures 
as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic and state executive orders” and against educational 
institutions, among others). 
71  See Todd D. Rakoff, The Five Justices of Contract Law, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 733 
(2016). 
72  See id. at 734. 
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A. Force Majeure 
Contract law resiliently evolves through the test of time, 
withstanding plagues, wars, and natural disasters. The cornerstone 
of contract law requires courts to respect and enforce what parties 
agree upon within the four corners of their agreement.73 Courts do 
not redraft or add new terms to agreements that parties already 
conclusively executed.74 Parties have the freedom to contract and 
freedom from contracts.75 Parties know best their business, 
circumstances, risks, and benefits when they execute 
agreements.76 Emergencies caused by natural disasters, 
epidemics, armed conflicts, and terrorism are among changes of 
events that parties typically anticipate and include in a contract’s 
force majeure provision.77  
 
73  See Todd D. Rakoff, Is Freedom from Contract Necessarily a Libertarian 
Freedom? 2004 WIS. L. REV. 477, 479–80 (2004) (“[M]en of full age and competent 
understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and [] their contracts when 
entered into freely and voluntarily shall be held sacred and shall be enforced by Courts of 
justice.”). 
74  See Owens v. Church, 675 S.W.2d 178, 185 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984) (“The 
freedom and sanctity of contract are cornerstones of our system of commercial law and 
order. Regardless of where our sympathies might lie in a given case, once it has been 
determined that a valid agreement is in existence the courts must enforce that contract.”); 
Nafta Traders, Inc. v. Quinn, 339 S.W.3d 84, 95 (Tex. 2011) (“As a fundamental matter, 
Texas law recognizes and protects a broad freedom of contract”); Bernstein v. 
TrackManager, Inc., 953 A.2d 1003, 1010 n.23 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“the concept of freedom 
on contract, which is a core concept recognized by Delaware law”). 
75  See Mark Pettit, Jr., Freedom, Freedom of Contract, and the “Rise and Fall”, 
79 B.U. L. REV. 263, 280–83 (1999) (discussing the individual autonomy of the parties in 
the two ideas of freedom of contract and freedom from contract); Venture Assoc. Corp. v. 
Zenith Data Sys. Corp., 96 F.3d 275, 281 (7th Cir. 1996) (Cudahy, J., concurring) 
(“Freedom not to contract should be protected as stringently as freedom to contract.”). 
76  See Emerald International Corp. v. WWMV, LLC, 2016 WL 4433357, at *3 
(E.D. Ky. Aug. 15, 2016) (“Parties are free to agree that specified events will excuse 
nonperformance of their obligations.”). 
77  Kyocera Corp. v. Hemlock Semiconductor, LLC, 886 N.W.2d 445, 448–49 
(Mich. Ct. of App. 2015) A force majeure in a long-term, commercial contract can be 
comprehensive, as follows: 
Neither Buyer nor Seller shall be liable for delays or failures in 
performance of its obligations under this Agreement that arise out 
of or result from causes beyond such party's control, including 
without limitation: acts of God; acts of the Government or the public 
enemy; natural disasters; fire; flood; epidemics; quarantine 
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Force majeure clauses excuse a party’s nonperformance 
when a specific, extraordinary event occurs that prevents the party 
from meeting obligations as described in the contract. In analyzing 
whether a party is excused under a force majeure, courts 
determine: (1) an event occurred meeting the contract's definition 
of force majeure event, and (2) that event caused the party's failure 
to perform.78 The party invoking the force majeure clause carries 
the burden of proof at trial.79 
 
restrictions; strikes; freight embargoes; war; acts of terrorism; 
equipment breakage (which is beyond the affected Buyer's or 
Seller's reasonable control and the affected Buyer or Seller shall 
promptly use all commercially reasonable efforts to remedy) that 
prevents Seller's ability to manufacture Product or prevents Buyer's 
ability to use such Product in Buyer's manufacturing operations for 
solar applications; or, in the case of Seller only, a default of a Seller 
supplier beyond Seller's reasonable control (in each case, a “Force 
Majeure Event”). In the event of any such delay or failure of 
performance by Buyer or Seller, the other party shall remain 
responsible for any obligations that have accrued to it but have not 
been performed by it as of the date of the Force Majeure Event. 
When the party suffering from the Force Majeure Event is able to 
resume performance, the other party shall resume its obligations 
hereunder. The Term of this Agreement may be extended for a 
period not to exceed three (3) years so as to complete the purchase 
and delivery of Product affected by a Force Majeure Event. The 
party suffering a Force Majeure Event shall provide the other party 
with prompt written notice of (i) the occurrence of the Force 
Majeure Event, (ii) the date such party reasonably anticipates 
resuming performance under this Agreement and, if applicable, (iii) 
such party's request to extend the Term of this Agreement. 
In addition, if due to a Force Majeure Event or any other cause, 
Seller is unable to supply sufficient goods to meet all demands from 
customers and internal uses, Seller shall have the right to allocate 
supply among its customers in any manner in which Seller, in its 
sole discretion, may determine. 
78  Emerald International Corp., 2016 WL 4433357, at *3 (“To invoke this 
provision, a party would need to show: (1) that an event occurred meeting the contract's 
definition of [force majeure event], and (2) that event caused the party's failure to 
perform.”). 
79  See Kyocera Corp., 886 N.W.2d at 446 (finding that plaintiff failed to 
adequately plead, according to force-majeure clause terms that its “delays or failure in 
performance of its obligations under [the] Agreement,” i.e., plaintiff's inability to pay, 
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The clause must contain specific events to excuse 
nonperformance caused by an event occurring.80 Illustratively, the 
force majeure clause in a natural gas sale and purchase agreement 
provides that contracting parties are released from their 
obligations “in cases of force majeure or chance events affecting 
the facilities used for the performance of this contract, such as, in 
particular: fire, flood, atmospheric disturbances, storm, tornado, 
earthquake, washout, landslide, lightning, epidemic, war, riot, 
civil war, insurrection, acts of public enemies, act of government, 
strike, lockout.”81 Only the occurrence of events specifically 
identified in the force majeure clause will excuse the party 
invoking it from nonperformance. If market conditions change 
and cause a drop in demand for natural gas, these events fall 
outside the scope of the clause and do not excuse 
nonperformance.82 
Consequently, when parties specify certain force majeure 
events in the contract, some courts do not require a showing that 
the event’s occurrence was unforeseeable, while other courts 
impose that requirement.83 The Fifth Circuit, for instance, does not 
 
“ar[o]se out of or result[ed] from . . . acts of the [Chinese] Government,” such that its 
performance should have been excused.”); see also Gulf States Protective Coatings, Inc. v. 
Caldwell Tanks, Inc., 2019 WL 7403970, at *9 (W.D. Kentucky, June 18, 2019) (“The 
party claiming force majeure has the burden to prove the defense at trial.”).  
80  In re Cablevision Consumer Litig., 864 F.Supp.2d 258, 264 (E.D.N.Y., 2012) 
(citing Reade v. Stoneybrook Realty, LLC, 434, 882 N.Y.S.2d 8 (2009)) (holding that 
force-majeure clauses “will generally only excuse a party's nonperformance if the event 
that caused the party's nonperformance is specifically identified”).  
81  U.S. v. Panhandle Eastern Corp., 693 F.Supp. 88, 96 (D. Del 1988). 
82  See id. (finding the force majeure Article XIII “contemplates such events as 
strikes, lockouts or epidemics, which might affect access to the facilities. However, alleged 
economic hardship resulting from market fluctuations is certainly not within the ambit of 
Article XIII.”). 
83  Compare, e.g., TEC Olmos, LLC v. ConocoPhillips Co., 555 S.W.3d 176, 182 
(Tex. Ct. of App. 2018) (noting an ongoing “debate regarding whether common-law 
notions of foreseeability have any place in the interpretation of modern-day force majeure 
clauses. The Third Circuit and the Fifth Circuit have reached differing results regarding 
whether, and under what circumstances, a showing of unforeseeability is required to show 
a force majeure event”), with Gulf Oil Corp., v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 706 F.2d 
444, 454 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding that even if the Gulf's routine mechanical repairs fell 
under the force majeure clause, their frequent occurrence disqualifies the force majeure 
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require unforeseeability if the contract explicitly specifies force 
majeure events.84 As long as the parties have anticipated the 
events and included them in the force majeure clause, the party 
invoking the clause should be relieved of liability for the 
occurrence regardless of whether the occurrence was foreseeable 
or unforeseeable.85 
If a force majeure clause contains a catch-all phrase at the 
end of a list of specific events, courts typically scrutinize whether 
an occurrence is reasonably within the scope.86 Courts decline 
 
nonperformance excuse); see also In re Cablevision Consumer Litig., 864 F. Supp. 2d at 
264 (noting how, under New York law, force majeure clauses are “construed narrowly and 
will generally only excuse a party’s nonperformance that has been rendered impossible by 
an unforeseen event”). 
84  See TEC Olmos, 555 S.W.3d at 183 (“[W]hen parties specify certain force 
majeure events, there is no need to show that the occurrence of such an event was 
unforeseeable.”). 
85  See Kodiak 1981 Drilling Partnership v. Delhi Gas Pipeline Corp., 736 S.W.2d 
715, 716, 721 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (quoting Eastern Air Lines, 
Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957, 992 (5th Cir. 1976)) (“[W]hen the 
promisor has anticipated a particular event by [] providing for it in a contract, he should be 
relieved of liability for the occurrence of such event regardless of whether it was 
foreseeable.”); see also Rowan Companies, Inc. v. Transco Exploration Co., Inc., 679 
S.W.2d 660, 664 (Tex.App.—Houston 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (“We hold, as a matter of 
law, that the rig's inability to perform was solely due to an event of force majeure as defined 
in the contract. Therefore, the force majeure clause controls the rights of the parties. . . . A 
fire beyond the control of Transco is within the contractual definition of a force majeure’ 
event.”). 
86  Here is a sample of a force majeure with a catch-all phrase in italics:  
Should either Party be prevented or hindered from complying with 
any obligation created under this Agreement, other than the 
obligation to pay money, by reason of fire, flood, storm, act of God, 
governmental authority, labor disputes, war or any other cause not 
enumerated herein but which is beyond the reasonable control of the 
Party whose performance is affected, then the performance of any 
such obligation is suspended during the period of, and only to the 
extent of, such prevention or hindrance, provided the affected Party 
exercises all reasonable diligence to remove the cause of force 
majeure. The requirement that any force majeure be remedied with 
all reasonable diligence does not require the settlement of strikes, 
lockouts or other labor difficulties by the Party involved. 
TEC Olmos, 555 S.W.3d at 179. See also Langham-Hill Petrol., Inc. v. S. Fuels Co., 813 
F.2d 1327, 1329–30 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding that downturn in market was foreseeable and 
 
JUNE 2021 CONTRACT AS EMERGENCY LAW 443 
overly broad interpretations and apply the precept of ejusdem 
generis to ensure proper results.87 Ejusdem generis dictates that 
“words constituting general language of excuse are not to be given 
the most expansive meaning possible, but are held to apply only 
to the same general kind or class as those specifically 
mentioned.”88 
Parties to a contract may not be able to anticipate all 
changes of events to be included in a force majeure clause, and 
they instead may choose a clause with broad scope. Contract 
interpretations of broadly worded force majeure clauses generally 
side with a narrow approach.89 Consider, this broadly worded 
 
outside the scope of “catch-all” force majeure clause); Benjamin Horney, Why Force 
Majeure Isn’t A Golden Ticket Out of M&A Deals, LAW360 (Apr. 20, 2020, 7:34 P.M. 
E.D.T.), https://www.law360.com/articles/1265259/why-force-majeure-isn-t-a-golden-
ticket-out-of-m-a-deals? (cautioning that force majeure clauses that “end by noting 
something akin to ‘anything else that's unforeseeable’[] make[] performance impossible. 
Such language serves to modify every word before it.”). 
87  See TEC Olmos, 555 S.W.3d at 181–82 & n.1 (finding “fluctuation in the 
commodities markets” cannot qualify as force majeure under the “catch-all” provision of 
this force majeure clause for two reasons: “First, it is unreasonable to interpret the “catch-
all” provision as broadly as suggested by Olmos. Second, application of the ejusdem 
generis doctrine compels the conclusion that a decline in oil and gas prices is not the sort 
of event covered by the force majeure clause.”). 
88  See Kel Kim Corp. v. Cent. Mkts., Inc., 516 N.Y.S.2d 806, 809 (App. Div. 3d 
Dep’t 1987), affd. 519 N.E.2d 295 (N.Y. 1987). See also Team Marketing USA Corp. v. 
Power Pact, LLC, 839 N.Y.S.2d 242, 246 (App. Div. 2007) (quoting Kel Kim Corp. v. 
Central Mkts., 70 N.Y.2d 900, 903, (1987) (finding that “[n]one of the specifically 
enumerated events in the clause at issue—strikes, boycotts, war, Acts of God, labor 
troubles, riots, and restraints on public authority—are similar in nature to Toyota's actions 
in rescheduling or cancelling the promotion schedule. Rather, the enumerated, 
unforeseeable events in the force majeure clause ‘pertain to a party's ability to conduct day-
to-day commercial operations,’ while the cancellation clause provided plaintiff with 
‘bargained-for protection of [its] . . . economic interests’ if the promotional events were 
rescheduled or cancelled.”); R&B Falcon Corp. v. Am. Expl. Co., 154 F.Supp.2d 969, 974–
75 (S.D.Tex. 2001) (stating that the force majeure “lists ‘riots, strikes, wars, insurrection, 
rebellions, terrorist acts, civil disturbances, dispositions or order of governmental 
authority . . . inability to obtain equipment, supplies or fuel’ as other items reasonably 
beyond the control of the parties.”). 
89  See Kel Kim Corp. v. Cent. Mkts., Inc., 519 N.E.2d 295, 296-97 (N.Y. 1987) 
(noting force majeure clauses are narrowly construed and contract nonperformance excuse 
is available “only if the force majeure clause specifically includes the event that actually 
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force majeure provision: “Any delay or failure of either party to 
perform its obligations under this Agreement shall be excused if, 
and to the extent that the delay or failure is caused or materially 
contributed to by force majeure or other acts or events beyond the 
reasonable control of a party hereto.”90 Interpreting this particular 
force majeure provision narrowly means the scope of the force 
majeure may cover the dramatic change in market conditions 
caused by an influenza epidemic as the occurrence was beyond 
the reasonable control of the party to excuse contract 
nonperformance.91 Yet, the interpretation cannot extend to “a 
change in purchaser demand—even a substantial change” because 
such a change is “a foreseeable part of doing business,” unable to 
excuse contract nonperformance.92  
In summary, there are no uniform court interpretations 
with respect to force majeure provisions and foreseeability, but 
courts generally embrace narrow interpretations to respect parties’ 
freedom to contract and avoid rewriting agreements for the 
parties. 
B. Force Majeure and Epidemics 
There are few reported cases involving contracts 
containing force majeure clauses covering epidemics or 
pandemics occurring in the past one hundred years. Notably, 
during the Spanish influenza of 1918, only one case, Citrus Soap 
Co. v. Peet Bros. Mfg. Co., was reported and penned by a lower 
court in California.93  
In that case, the plaintiff brought an action to recover 
damages for breach of contract against the defendant for the sale 
 
prevents a party’s performance”); In re Cablevision Consumer Litig., 864 F. Supp. 2d at264 
(under New York law, force majeure clauses are “construed narrowly”). 
90  See Rexing Quality Eggs v. Rembrandt Enters., 360 F.Supp.3d 817, 840 (S.D. 
Ind. 2018). 
91  Id. at 840–41. 
92  Id. at 841. 
93  Citrus Soap Co. v. Peet Bros. Mfg. Co., 194 P.2d 715 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1920); 
see Russell Lewis, et al., Covid-19: Force Majeure to the Rescue?, THE HOUS. LAW. 42–
43 (Mar./Apr. 2020), https://issuu.com/leosur/docs/thl_marapr20/42 (“Despite the history 
of the Spanish Flu, we could find no reported cases from any U.S. jurisdiction that 
addressed force majeure in the context of an epidemic, pandemic or disease outbreak in the 
human population.”). 
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of glycerine merchandise.94 The parties entered into a contract 
dated November 7, 1918, wherein the plaintiff seller sold eleven 
to twelve drums of crude glycerine to defendant, and the goods 
were to be delivered “as made, but entire delivery to be completed 
prior to December 31, 1918.”95 Glycerine as sold by the plaintiff 
was the by-product for the defendant to manufacture soap.96 The 
contract contained the following force majeure clause: 
 
“This contract is made subject to suspension in 
case of fire, flood, explosion, strike or 
unavoidable accident to the machinery or the 
works of the producers or receivers of this 
material, or from any interference in plant by 
reason of which either buyers or sellers are 
prevented from producing, delivering or 
receiving the goods and in such event the delivery 
thus suspended is to be made after such 
disabilities have been removed; otherwise to be 
fulfilled in good faith. Notice, with full 
particulars and the probable term of the 
continuance of such disability, shall be given to 
the other party hereto, within ten days of the date 
of the occurrence of such disability.” 
 
The defendant accepted the delivery of the first three drums but 
refused to accept the subsequent deliveries of the remaining nine 
drums. The plaintiff brought the breach of contract action to 
recover the difference between the agreed price per the contract 
and the market price when the defendant refused delivery.97 The 
trial court found that the plaintiff performed in accordance with 
the contract terms, and the defendant appealed.98 
During the contract time period of November and 
December 1918, the city of San Diego, where the plaintiff’s 
 
94  See Lewis et al., supra note 93, at 715. 
95  Id. 
96  Id. 
97  Id. 
98  Id. (“goods were shipped and delivered in all respects in conformity with said 
contract of sale”). 
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factory was located to make and distribute glycerine, adopted a 
quarantine to control the spread of the Spanish influenza.99 On 
December 5, 1918, the quarantine caused a delay in the plaintiff’s 
production, and the plaintiff invoked the force majeure clause by 
sending a letter to the defendant on December 9, 1918: 
 
Please be advised that we have been forced to 
close down by the health authorities due to the 
quarantine established in San Diego against the 
influenza. The quarantine went into effect Friday 
morning, the 6th of December, and we may be 
compelled to take advantage of the contingency 
clause of our contract. However, we have 
finished six drums of the glycerine, three of 
which we have already shipped, and we are in 
hopes of being able to deliver the entire amount 
by December 31st.100 
 
The court found that the plaintiff’s letter sufficiently complied 
with the contract requirements, reasonably warned the defendant 
of the delay due to the quarantine, and implied that the delay might 
cause the completion beyond December 31.101 Moreover, the 
defendant did not object to the letter. Accordingly, the court held 
that the plaintiff was entitled to perform the contract within a 
reasonable time after December 31, and the defendant must 
therefore perform its obligation to pay the plaintiff.102 
In the 21st century, the first pandemic was the H1N1 of 
2009.103 Among the many reported court opinions related to 
 
99  Id. at 716. 
100  Id. 
101  Id. 
102  Id. 
103  The World Health Organization declared H1N1 flu a pandemic on June 11, 
2009. See 2009 H1N1 Flu (“Swine Flu”) and You, CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND 
PREVENTION (Feb. 10, 2010, 5:00 P.M. E.T.), https://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/qa.htm. The 
United States declared H1N1 a public health emergency on April 26, 2009; 2009 H1N1 
Flu Outbreak: Determination that a Public Health Emergency Exists, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (Apr. 19, 2013), https://www.phe.gov/emergency/news/
healthactions/phe/Pages/h1n1.aspx; see also McGhee v. City of Flagstaff, 2020 WL 
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H1N1, none involved contract disputes and force majeure.104 
Perhaps parties settled their contract disputes either out of court or 
prior to courts issuing written decisions as they had done in 
resolving allegations of breach of contract and nonperformance in 
the earlier epidemic.  
Indeed, before the H1N1 pandemic, parties to contracts 
experienced disruptions caused by the deadly Severe Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic in 2003.105 In contract 
performance disputes due to SARS, parties filed lawsuits but 
subsequently settled matters outside of court. For instance, the 
American Association for Cancer Research planned to host its 
2003 annual conference for 16,000 attendees and signed contracts 
with hotels in Toronto and the convention center; however, three 
days before the conference was scheduled to open, AACR 
canceled the event due to the SARS epidemic.106 For the hotels, 
all of their contracts with AACR contained force majeure clauses 
that allowed termination of contracts due to major unforeseen 
events that would render performance impossible. The hotels and 
the convention center insisted that the force majeure clauses do 
not apply “because the emergency was confined to area hospitals, 
there was not risk to the general public, and business was 
 
2309881, *2 (D. Arizona 2020) (“from April 12, 2009 to April 10, 2010, CDC estimated 
there were 60.8 million cases and 12,469 deaths in the United States due to the H1N1 
virus”). 
104  See Brendan S. Everman, Force Majeure and Covid-19 Live Event 
Cancellations, 43-MAY L.A. LAW. 36 (May 2020) (“Recent epidemics like Zika, Ebola, 
H1N1, and SARS did not result in the widespread cancellation of high-profile events. 
Consequently, there is no clear legal precedent for how courts would apply force majeure 
clauses”); see also Bruce Myint, SARS Puts Contracts Under A Microscope, MEETINGS & 
CONVENTIONS (May 1, 2003), http://www.meetings-conventions.com/Newsline/SARS-
Puts-Contracts-Under-a-Microscope/ (noting “there is very little clear precedent” in the 
law regarding force majeure clauses in modern contracts because the clauses “often are 
limited only to situations that would make it either ‘illegal’ or ‘impossible’ to hold the 
event”). 
105  See Martha Collins, Cancellation and Force Majeure Issues in the SARS Era, 
MEETINGSNET (Mar. 1, 2005), https://www.meetingsnet.com/negotiatingcontracts/cancel
lation-and-force-majeure-issues-sars-era (“Epidemics and diseases that could affect travel 
and the safety of attendees are now foreseeable and should be contemplated in the 
contract.”). 
106  See id. 
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proceeding as usual.”107 The total damages as asserted by the 
hotels and the convention center reached $6.2 million against 
AACR.108 AACR then attempted to convince its insurance 
company that AACR’s policy with Aon Insurance Company 
covered the situation.109 Ultimately, the parties settled their 
disputes out of court.110 
On a lesser scale of severity, the global avian influenza 
(H7N9) outbreak of 2013 led the United States to declare a public 
health emergency on April 19, 2013.111 The avian influenza 
impacted the poultry industry in the U.S., and at least one court 
issued an opinion addressing contract nonperformance and force 
majeure clause. The case, Rembrandt Enterprises, Inc. v. Dahmes 
Stainless, Inc., serves as a good illustration and valuable reminder 
of contract law during a state of emergency. 
In Rembrandt Enterprises, the district court denied 
Dahmes’s summary judgment motion on the issue that the force 
majeure clause did not supplant Rembrandt’s excuse of 
performance.112 In that case, Rembrandt, an egg producer 
planning to build a new egg processing plant near one of its 
existing facilities planned for expansion, entered into an 
agreement with Dahmes to install a new egg dryer for $8.5 million 
dollars.113 The agreement required Dahmes to complete the 
installation by January 1, 2016.114 In the spring of 2015, the highly 
pathogenic avian influenza hit the U.S.115 The flu forced 
Rembrandt to kill more than one million birds and reduced 
production capacity by over 50 percent.116 Rembrandt supplied the 
 
107  Id. 
108  Id. 
109  Id. 
110  Id. 
111  See Avian Influenza A (H7N9) Virus, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND 
HUMAN SERVICES (Nov. 21, 2013), https://www.phe.gov/emergency/news/healthactions/
phe/Pages/H7N9-influenza-virus.aspx. 
112  Rembrandt Enterprises, Inc. v. Dahmes Stainless, Inc., 2017 WL 3929308 
(N.D. Iowa 2017).  
113  Id. at *1–2. 
114  Id. at *2. 
115  Id. 
116  Id. 
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reduced egg capacity on a pro rata basis to its buyers.117 By May 
2015, Rembrandt stopped the facility expansion and informed 
Dahmes about the stoppage.118 Rembrandt sought a declaratory 
relief regarding its contract with Dahmes and requested restitution 
and an accounting of Dahmes’ expenses.119 Dahmes asserted that 
Rembrandt breached the contract and sought lost profits of $2.4 
million, plus costs incurred.120 Rembrandt already paid Dahmes 
$4.31 million prior to the alleged breach.121 
At summary judgment, Dahmes argued that the “force 
majeure superseded any other claims Rembrandt might raise to 
excuse the breach.”122 In ruling against Dahmes, the court noted 
that the contract between Rembrandt and Dahmes contained a 
force majeure provision which states that “[n]either party shall be 
liable to the other for failure or delay in performance of the Work 
caused by war, riots, insurrections, proclamations, floods, fires, 
explosions, acts of any governmental body, terrorism, or other 
similar events beyond the reasonable control and without the fault 
of such party.”123 The contract defined the “Work” as the design, 
 
117  Id. 
118  Id. at *3. 
119  Id. at *1. 
120  Id. 
121  Id. 
122  Id. at *10. 
123  Id. at *12. The force majeure provision states: 
Neither party shall be liable to the other for failure or delay in 
performance of the Work caused by war, riots, insurrections, 
proclamations, floods, fires, explosions, acts of any governmental 
body, terrorism, or other similar events beyond the reasonable 
control and without the fault of such party (“Force Majeure Event”). 
Nevertheless, such party shall use its best efforts to mitigate the 
effect and to perform in spite of the difficulties causing such failure 
or delay and shall resume performance with the utmost dispatch as 
soon as the cessation of the Force Majeure Event permits. Any party 
claiming force majeure shall give prompt written notice thereof to 
the other party. Notwithstanding the foregoing or any other 
provision of this Agreement, if either party is unable to resume 
performance within ninety (90) days after commencement of a 
Force Majeure Event, then the other party shall have the right to 
immediately terminate this Agreement with all available insurance 
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equipment, and labor provided by Dahmes for the building, 
including delivering and installing the egg dryer.124 Accordingly, 
the court found that the clause “applies to a failure or delay in the 
performance of Dahmes' obligations under the contract.”125 The 
force majeure did not apply to Rembrandt’s obligation to pay 
under the contract.126 The express language of the force majeure 
clause “demonstrates that it does not apply” to the avian flu 
outbreak, as the parties did not intend for an unforeseen event such 
as the avian flu to prevent the construction and installation of the 
dryer by Dahmes.127 This holding illustrates the need for parties to 
specifically include language for a pandemic in the future. 
Regarding the COVID-19 pandemic and force majeure 
provisions, parties to contracts invoke them to excuse 
nonperformance and minimize damages.128In re Cinemex USA 
Real Estatle Holdings, Inc., is an example of how courts examine 
a force majeure clause in assessing whether the clause covers 
COVID-19 related events to excuse contract performance.129 
Here, the contract for commercial lease of theatre movie venues 
contained the following clause in contemplation of events that 
parties might not be able to perform their obligations:  
 
If either party to this Lease, as the result of any (i) 
strikes, lockouts or labor disputes, (ii) inability to 
 
proceeds to be held in a separate account by the policy insured as a 
fiduciary which will distribute the proceeds between the parties in 
an equitable fashion. 
124  Id. at *12. 
125  Id. 
126  Id.  
127  Id. at *12–13. 
128  See generally UPDATE: Force Majeure Under the Coronavirus (COVID-19) 
Pandemic, PAUL WEISS (Mar. 16, 2020), https://www.paulweiss.com/practices/litigation/
litigation/publications/update-force-majeure-under-the-coronavirus-covid-19-
pandemic?id=30881; see also Joshua M. Cartee & William M. Mattes, Origins of the Force 
Majeure Clause and Impossibility of Contractual Performance Defense, NAT. L. REV. 
(Mar. 19, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/origins-force-majeure-clause-and-
impossibility-contractual-performance-defense; John Delikanakis & Gil Kahn, Force 
Majeure Clauses and the Impossible and the Impractical, SNELL & WILMER (Apr. 7, 2020), 
https://www.swlaw.com/publications/legal-alerts/2739. 
129  In re Cinemex USA Real Estatle Holdings, Inc., et al., 2021 WL 564486, *4 
(S.D. Fla. 2021). 
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obtain labor or materials or reasonable substitutes 
therefor, (iii) the inability to obtain materials or 
labor at reasonable prices due to the occurrence 
of a hurricane or other nature disaster or due to 
terrorism; (iv) acts of God, governmental action, 
condemnation, civil commotion, fire or other 
casualty, or (v) other conditions similar to those 
enumerated in this Section beyond the reasonable 
control of the party obligated to perform (other 
than failure to timely pay monies required to be 
paid under this Lease), fails punctually to perform 
any obligation on its part to be performed under 
this Lease, then such failure shall be excused and 
not be a breach of this Lease by the party in 
question, but only to the extent occasioned by 
such event.130 
 
The tenant refused to make payments under the lease agreement 
citing to impossibility of performance while the government 
orders were in effect.131 With respect to rent accruing during the 
government ordered shutdown, the court assessed “whether it was 
foreseeable at the time the lease was made that this shutdown 
would occur.”132 The court found that, on the one hand, COVID-
19 events that caused the shutdown were not foreseeable. On the 
other hand, the lease agreement anticipated such events and 
included them in the contract. Accordingly, the court ruled, the 
failure to operate the theatre was excused due to the shutdown 
orders.133  
Likewise, in JN Contemporary Art LLC v. Phillips 
Auctioneers LLC, Southern District of New York court relieved 
the defendant from its nonperformance liability due to COVID-19 
force majeure.134 In that case, the plaintiff art dealer and the 
defendant auction house entered into a contract governing the sale 
 
130  Id. (emphasis added by the court). 
131  Id. at *1. 
132  Id. at *3. 
133  Id. 
134  JN Contemporary Art LLC v. Phillips Auctioneers LLC, 2020 WL 7405262 
(S.D.N.Y. 2020). 
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of two paintings in June 2019.135 The defendant agreed to pay the 
plaintiff a guaranteed minimum price in connection with the 
sale.136 One of the two paintings was sold the same day the parties 
executed the agreement but the other painting was scheduled for 
auction in May 2020.137 By March 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic 
crippled New York and Governor Andrew Cuomo declared a State 
Disaster Emergency and issued executive orders restricting and 
then barring all non-essential business activities until June 
2020.138 In light of the circumstances, the defendant terminated 
the agreement.139 The plaintiff sought an order to compel the 
defendant to include the second painting at the defendant’s next 
auction and pay the Guaranteed Minimum.140 Alternatively, the 
plaintiff sought compensatory damages of $7 million and punitive 
damages of $10 million.141 
The court turned to the agreement’s “Termination 
Provision” for its force majeure interpretation. The Termination 
Provision stated:  
 
“In the event that the auction is postponed for 
circumstances beyond our or your reasonable 
control, including, without limitation, as a result 
of natural disaster, fire, flood, general strike, war, 
armed conflict, terrorist attack or nuclear or 
chemical contamination, we may terminate this 
Agreement with immediate effect. In such event, 
our obligation to make payment of the 
Guaranteed Minimum shall be null and void and 
we shall have no other liability to you.”142 
 
The court noted that the COVID-19 pandemic and government 
emergency executive orders “fall squarely under the ambit” of the 
 
135  Id. at *1. 
136  Id.  
137  Id. at *1–2. 
138  Id. at *3. 
139  Id. at *4. 
140  Id. 
141  Id. 
142  Id. at *2 (emphasis in original). 
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force majeure clause because they are “beyond the parties’ 
reasonable control.”143 The court also looked to Black’s Law 
Dictionary and the Oxford English Dictionary for support that the 
COVID-19 pandemic is a “natural disaster.”144 As a natural 
disaster, the COVID-19 caused the “cessation of normal business 
activity” that was beyond the parties’ control.145 In other words, 
the pandemic’s circumstances were “envisioned” by the 
Termination Provision.146 Accordingly, the defendant was entitled 
to terminate the agreement.147 
As seen, contract law on force majeure resiliently applies 
to private contracts ordering under state of emergency situations. 
Through many different epidemics and pandemics, parties 
excused nonperformance by allocating their risks and anticipating 
events with specificities in force majeure provisions. This explicit 
inclusion of potential pandemics can save parties from 
unanticipated costs without the need for government intervention. 
C. The Doctrine of Impossibility and Supervening Events 
In situations where parties to a contract cannot perform 
the contract due to supervening events but their contract does not 
include a force majeure provision to accommodate the events, 
contract law provides the doctrine of impossibility, or also later 
referred to by the courts as commercial impracticability to excuse 
nonperformance.  
The doctrine of impossibility, as discussed in much 
 
143  Id. at *7.  
144  Id. Other courts have also found that the Covid-19 pandemic is a natural 
disaster. See, e.g., Easom v. US Well Services, Inc., 2021 WL 1092344, *8 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 
19, 2021) (finding the Covid-19 pandemic “qualifies as a disaster under the Worker 
Retraining and Notification Act); AB Stable VIII LLC v. Maps Hotels & Resorts One LLC, 
No. 20-CV-0310, 2020 WL 7024929, at *58 (Del. Ch. Nov. 30, 2020) (“The COVID-19 
pandemic arguably fits this definition [of natural disaster]” under a purchase and sale 
agreement); Pa. Democratic Party v. Boockvar, 238 A.3d 345, 370 (Pa. 2020) (“We have 
no hesitation in concluding that the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic equates to a natural 
disaster” under a Pennsylvania statute); Friends of Danny DeVito v. Wolf, 227 A.3d 872, 
889 (Pa. 2020) (“The COVID-19 pandemic is, by all definitions, a natural disaster” under 
a Pennsylvania statute). 
145  JN Contemporary Art LLC, supra note 134, at *8. 
146  Id. 
147  Id. at *9. 
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greater depth elsewhere, enjoys its roots in Roman law that “there 
is no obligation to the impossible.”148 Impossibility can arise due 
to unexpected changes of circumstances.149 As to the theory of 
supervening events or changed circumstances, the doctrine of 
impossibility owes its origin to Canon law’s doctrine of changed 
circumstances.150 
Generally, “by act of god, the law or the other party” 
which renders the performance of a contract impossible, the party 
is excused from performing its end of the contract.151 The United 
States Supreme Court first recognized the doctrine of 
impossibility in The Tornado v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. in 1883.152 
In applying the doctrine of impossibility, courts generally do not 
readily excuse the parties from their contractual obligations.153 
 
148  See James Gordley, Impossibility and Changed and Unforeseen Circumstances, 
52 AM. J. OF COMP. L. 513, 513 (2004) (tracing the origins of the impossibility doctrine). 
149  See Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 315 (D.C. Cir. 
1966). 
150  See id. See generally Philip J. McConnaughay, The Scope of Autonomy in 
International Contracts and Its Relation to Economic Regulation and Development, 39 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 595, 614 n.37 (2001) (“Western contract law doctrines of 
impossibility, commercial impracticality, frustration, and force majeure reflect a similar 
notion of the primacy and sanctity of written contracts.”).  
151  See, e.g., Columbus R. Power & Light Co. v. Columbus, 249 U.S. 399, 412 
(1919) (denying World War I’s outbreak rendered performance of railway contract 
impossible); Wheelabrator Envirotech Operating Servs. v. Mass. Laborers Dist. Council 
Local 1144, 88 F.3d 40, 45 (1st Cir. 1996) (noting neither impossibility nor impracticability 
excuse a party’s express undertaking to perform). 
152  See The Tornado v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 108 U.S. 342, 351 (1883) (“[I]n 
contracts in which the performance depends on the continued existence of a given person 
or thing, a condition is implied that the impossibility of performance arising from the 
perishing of the person or thing shall excuse the performance.”). The Tornado court 
adopted the contract rule on impossibility excuse from the celebrated English case, Taylor 
v. Coldwell, 3 Best & S. 826 (1863); see also Dermott v. Jones, 69 U.S. 1, 6 (1864) (“It 
regards the sanctity of contracts. It requires parties to do what they have agreed to do. If 
unexpected impediments lie in the way, and a loss must ensue, it leaves the loss where the 
contract places it. If the parties have made no provision for a dispensation, the rule of law 
gives none. It does not allow a contract fairly made to be annulled, and it does not permit 
to be interpolated what the parties themselves have not stipulated.”); Opera Co. of Boston, 
Inc. v. Wolf Trap Foundation for Performing Arts, 817 F.2d 1094, 1097–1102 (4th Cir. 
1987) (discussing the evolution of the impossibility of performance doctrine). 
153  See generally Jennifer Camero, Mission Impracticable: The Impossibility of 
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The nonperformance must objectively be deemed as impossible. 
The objective standard of impossibility prevents the party seeking 
excuse to unilaterally redraft the contract or add new terms to the 
contract.154 For instance, in North German Lloyd v. Guaranty 
Trust Co., the Court excused contract performance where the 
owner of the German steamship could not complete the voyage to 
deliver gold to England on the eve of war in Europe because the 
ship would be seized as a prize.155 In Montgomery v. Board of 
Education of Liberty TP., Union County, the Ohio Supreme Court 
did not excuse the school board from their obligation to pay bus 
drivers during the Spanish flu of 1918 that caused school 
closures.156 The Court rejected the defense that the school board’s 
performance to pay the drivers pursuant to the contract terms 
during the highly contagious flu period was made impossible by 
the health authority’s order.157 
Higher cost of performance than previously anticipated in 
the contract generally fails to meet the impossibility 
 
Commercial Impracticability, 13 U. of N.H. L. REV. 1, 3 (2015); United States v. Gleason, 
175 U. S. 588, 602 (1900) (“[I]f a party by his contract charge himself with an obligation 
possible to be performed, he must make it good, unless his performance is rendered 
impossible by the act of God, the law, or the other party. Difficulties, even if unforeseen, 
and however great, will not excuse him. If parties have made no provision for a 
dispensation, the rule of law gives none, nor, in such circumstances, can equity interpose.”). 
154  See generally Columbus R. Power & Light Co. v. Columbus, 249 U.S. 399, 412 
(1919) (“Where the parties have made no provision for a dispensation, the terms of the 
contract must prevail.”); United States v. Gleason, 175 U.S. 588, 602 (1900) (“it is 
competent for parties to a contract, . . . to make it a term of the contract . . . , shall be final 
and conclusive, and that, in the absence of fraud or of mistake so gross as to necessarily 
imply bad faith, such decision will not be subjected to the revisory power of the courts.”); 
Chicago, M. & S.P.R. Co. v. Hoyt, 149 U. S. 1, 14, 15 (1893) (“There can be no question 
that a party may by an absolute contract bind himself or itself to perform things which 
subsequently become impossible, or pay damages for the nonperformance, and such 
construction is to be put upon an unqualified undertaking, where the event which causes 
the impossibility might have been anticipated and guarded against in the contract, or where 
the impossibility arises from the act or default of the promisor. But where the event is of 
such a character that it cannot be reasonably supposed to have been in the contemplation 
of the contracting parties when the contract was made, they will not be held bound by 
general words, which, though large enough to include, were not used with reference to the 
possibility of the particular contingency which afterwards happens.”). 
155  See North German Lloyd v. Guaranty Trust Co., 244 U.S. 12, 22–23 (1917). 
156  Montgomery v. Board of Educ. 131 N.E. 497, 497 (Ohio 1921). 
157  See id. 
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requirement.158 Illustratively, in Columbus R. Power & Light Co. 
v. Columbus, the Supreme Court rejected that World War I’s 
outbreak rendered performance of railway contract impossible 
due to higher costs caused by the war.159 Under the modern 
approach of impossibility, some courts focus on commercial 
impracticability due to difficulty attributed to either physical or 
substantially higher cost.160 
Unanticipated government regulations may render 
contracts impossible to perform. For instance, in International 
Minerals and Chemical Corp. v. Llano, Inc., the Tenth Circuit 
ruled that the buyer, International Minerals and Chemical Corp 
(IMC), was excused from purchasing the minimum purchase 
obligations under the contract due to changes in government 
regulation that rendered the contract impossible.161 In that case, 
IMC entered into a contract with Llano for the purchase of natural 
gas. The contract contained provisions related to the minimum 
purchase obligation, stating in the event the buyer is “unable to 
receive gas as provided in the contract for any reason beyond the 
reasonable control of the parties . . . ” then “an appropriate 
adjustment in the minimum purchase requirements . . . shall be 
made.”162 Subsequently, in December 1978, the New Mexico 
Environmental Improvement Board (EIB) promulgated 
 
158  See generally Columbus R. Power & Light, 249 U.S. at 411 (rejecting the 
railroad company’s contention that “the conditions following the World 
War . . . particularly in the great increase in wages by the arbitral award of the War Labor 
Board,” caused the “subsequent keeping of the contract practically impossible, except at a 
ruinous loss to the company”). Nicholas R. Weiskop, Frustration of Contractual 
Purpose—Doctrine or Myth?, 70 ST. JOHN L. REV. 239, 270 n.126 (1996) (“[T]he 
traditional reluctance of American courts to excuse a performance made significantly more 
expensive than anticipated by supervening circumstance.”). 
159  Columbus R. Power & Light Co., 249 U.S. at 413–14 (“It is undoubtedly true 
that the breaking out of the World War was not contemplated, nor was the subsequent 
action of the War Labor Board within the purview of the parties when the contract was 
made. . . . We are unable to find here the intervention of that superior force which ends the 
obligation of a valid contract by preventing its performance. It may be, and taking the 
allegations of the bill to be true, it undoubtedly is, a case of a hard bargain. But equity does 
not relieve from hard bargains simply because they are such.”). 
160  See Mineral Park Land v. Howard, 156 P. 458, 460 (1916). 
161  See International Minerals & Chemical Corp. v. Llano, Inc., 770 F.2d 879 (10th 
Cir. 1985). 
162  See id. at 887. 
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Regulation 508 to limit from potash processing equipment and 
encouraged compliances “as expeditiously as practicable” and not 
later than December 31, 1982.163 IMC participated with the EIB 
in the Rule 508 rulemaking process and complied with the new 
regulation.164 Consequently, IMC did not need as much natural 
gas and asserted that it should be excused from accepting the 
minimum purchase requirement under the contract.165 
In interpreting the contract terms and ruling for IMC, the 
Tenth Circuit found that “unable” meant “impracticability” due to 
“having to comply with a supervening governmental 
regulation.”166 Because there existed “no technically suitable way 
for IMC to comply with the EIB's Regulation 508 without shutting 
down the Ozarks and changing to the SOP, with the concomitant 
decrease in natural gas consumption, we hold that the adjustment 
provision of paragraph 16 of the contract was triggered.”167 
Accordingly, IMC was “unable, for reasons beyond its reasonable 
control, to receive its minimum purchase obligation of natural 
gas” and the amount must be adjusted.168 The Tenth Circuit held 
that IMC should “not be required to pay for any natural gas it did 
not take under the contract.”169 
In the current COVID-19 pandemic, parties to contract 
who are unable to perform may assert the defense of impossibility. 
The doctrine of impossibility resiliently allows courts to 
determine whether parties to a contract are excused from 
nonperformance of obligations under contracts due to the arrival 
of COVID-19, subsequent government orders to shut down, and 
social distancing.  
For instance, students filed a number of breach of contract 
cases against their universities for pivoting to online education and 
activities. In Hiatt v. Brigham Young University, the student 
brought a breach of contract and unjust enrichment action against 
the University arising from the change from in-person to online 
 
163  Id. at 883. 
164  Id. 
165  Id. at 884. 
166  Id. at 886–87. 
167  Id. at 887. 
168  Id. 
169  Id. 
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classes and campus activities.170 The University moved to dismiss 
the suit for failure to state a claim. The court denied the motion 
because the student sufficiently alleged that he performed his 
obligation under the contract, but the University failed to perform 
their obligations.171 Also, the court rejected the University’s 
affirmative defense of impracticability defense that it was 
impracticable for BYU to provide in-person education and 
services during the COVID-19 pandemic.172 The court noted that 
under Utah law, the dismissal of a claim for failure to state claim 
on the basis of an affirmative defense can only occur if “the 
defense is clear from the face of the Complaint.”173 Also, the 
doctrine of impracticability excuses a party’s performance if an 
unforeseen event occurs after contract formation and without fault 
of the obligated party, rendering “the performance impossible or 
highly impracticable.”174 Parties who assume the risk of 
supervening events cannot defend on grounds of 
impracticability.175 Here, the University urged the court to take 
judicial notice of the COVID-19 pandemic and government orders 
that cause the University’s performance impracticable. Moreover, 
the University asserted that the student himself “bore the risk of a 
supervening event” because the student’s Financial Responsibility 
Declaration in which the student agreed to “pay all tuition upon 
registration.”176 At the early stage of the litigation, the court could 
not grant the University’s motion to dismiss based on the 
affirmative defense of impracticability because it is “essential to 
know which party bears the risk” before the court could determine 
whether impracticability is a valid defense.177 The court found that 
the language of the students’ Financial Responsibility Declaration 
“does not unequivocally answer which party bears the risk” and 
therefore, the University’s defense is not clear on the face of the 
 
170  Hiatt v. Brigham Young University, 2021 WL 66298 (D. Utah Jan. 7, 2021). 
171  See id. at *2–3. 
172  Id. at *4. 
173  Id. 
174  Id. 
175  Id. 
176  Id. 
177  Id. 
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complaint.178  
Another type of case involving breach of contract and the 
doctrine of impossibility defense is the enforcement of settlement 
agreement that at least one court has issued an opinion. 
Illustratively, in Belk v. Le Chaperon Rouge Co., the parties 
entered into a settlement agreement in March 2020 for a non-
contract case.179 The settlement agreement became a contract 
between the parties. The plaintiff then sought to enforce the 
agreement but the defendant asserted that due to COVID-19 and 
government shutdown order of children centers, including 
defendant’s facilities, the defendant could not pay the agreed 
amount under the settlement.180 The court ruled in favor of the 
plaintiff upon a finding that the defendant was fully aware by the 
time of entering the settlement agreement that the government 
already declared a state of emergency, asked educational 
institutions to move online, and urged all not to attend indoor 
events.181 Therefore, the court rejected the defendant’s defense of 
impossibility.182 The court ordered enforcement of the settlement 
agreement.183 Because of the lack of clarification in the contract 
about how to proceed if the pandemic were to interfere with the 
contract, the plaintiff was forced to perform. 
D. Frustration of Purpose Doctrine 
The twin sibling of the doctrine of impossibility to excuse 
nonperformance of a contract is frustration of purpose. Under 
contract law, a person who is still capable of performing the 
contract does not perform the contract because the value of the 
contract to that person has been reduced significantly. The 
 
178  Id. See also Gibson v. Lynn University, Inc., 2020 WL 7024463, (S.D. Fla. 
2020) (denying the defendant University’s motion to dismiss upon a finding that the 
University failed to conclusively establish that the breach of contract claim was barred by 
the defense of impossibility). 
179  Belk v. Le Chaperon Rouge Co., 2020 WL 3642880, *10 (N.D. Ohio Jul 6, 
2020). 
180  See id. 
181  Id. 
182  Id. (additionally, the court found that the defendant failed to demonstrate 
financially that the defendant could not pay in accordance with the settlement agreement). 
183  Id. 
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purpose of the contract is frustrated.184 In other words, the doctrine 
of frustration of purpose is distinct from the doctrine of 
impossibility.185 In impossibility or commercial impracticability, 
the party’s nonperformance is excused because the cost of 
performance is prohibitive compared to what is contemplated in 
the contract.186 Also, with a supervening event, the party cannot 
perform due to the person or the thing perishing which causes 
performance of the contract to be impossible.187 However, under 
the doctrine of frustration of purpose, the ability to perform exists, 
and the party to the contract can still perform because there is no 
impossibility of performance.188 Nevertheless, the party does not 
wish to perform because of the diminished value of the 
performance. The excuse for nonperformance in frustration of 
purpose, however, requires that a supervening event occurs that 
causes the frustration. Also, the party asserting the defense of 
frustration of purpose neither assumes the risk nor is at fault.189 
Underlying the doctrine of frustration of purpose is economic 
efficiency, waste prevention, and freedom from contract.190  
Relating back to Rembrandt Enterprise v. Dahmes 
discussed in the force majeure section, frustration of purpose of 
contract during a pandemic is illustrated.191 Here, Rembrandt 
ordered Dahmes to stop building and installing the egg dryer 
 
184  See In re Cinemex USA Real Estate Holdings, Inc., 2021 WL 564486, *3 (S.D. 
Fla. Jan. 27, 2021). 
185  See id. 
186  See id. 
187  See id. 
188  Id. (noting “Impossibility of performance refers to the nature of the thing to be 
done, and . . . frustration of purpose arises when one of the parties finds that the purposes 
for which he or she bargained [has been unfulfilled] because of the failure of consideration 
or impossibility of performance by the other party”). 
189  See Michelle L. Evans, Impossibility of Performing Contract, 102 AM. JUR. 
PROOF OF FACTS 3d 401 (2008). 
190  See City of Savage v. Formanek, 459 N.W.2d 173, 176 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 265 (Am. L. Inst. 1981) (“Where, after a 
contract is made, a party's principal purpose is substantially frustrated without his fault by 
the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which 
the contract was made, his remaining duties to render performance are discharged, unless 
the language or the circumstances indicate the contrary.”). 
191  Rembrandt Enterprises, Inc. v. Dahmes Stainless, Inc., 2017 WL 3929308 
(N.D. Iowa, Sep. 7, 2017). 
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several months after contract formation. Rembrandt cited to the 
avian flu for the severe drop in egg demand that forced Rembrandt 
to scuttle the new facility construction, including the purchase and 
installation of the new dryer for the facility. Under contract law, 
Rembrandt may attempt to rely on the doctrine of frustration of 
purpose to excuse its performance. That means Rembrandt may 
argue that its principal purpose to “supply equipment for the egg 
processing facility under construction” at Rembrandt's new 
facility was frustrated. Therefore, the egg dryer to be completed 
by Dahmes yielded little or no value to Rembrandt.192 Whether 
Rembrandt would prevail depends on whether Dahmes also 
possessed the same understanding of Rembrandt’s purpose when 
the parties entered the contract.193 
During COVID-19, parties to contract breached cases 
routinely asserting frustration of purpose as a defense. For 
example, in the bankruptcy case involving Cinemex USA Real 
Estate Holdings, Inc., the debtors were in the theatre movie 
business in twelve states.194 The debtors sought to delay payments 
for rent incurred after June 5, 2020, relying on the doctrine of 
frustration of purpose as excuse for nonperformance. The court in 
that case, applying Florida contract law on frustration of purpose, 
observed that the defense is not available if relevant business risk 
was “foreseeable” at contract formation and “could have been the 
subject of an express contractual agreement.”195 The court took 
notice that the government shutdown of business in Florida prior 
to June 5, 2020 made it impossible for the debtors to operate the 
theatre. However, when the government lifted the shutdown order 
on June 5, 2020, the debtors could have reopened their business, 
 
192  Id. at *12 (N.D. Iowa, Sep. 7, 2017) (“Rembrandt contends that its obligation 
to buy the Dahmes dryer is excused because, the Thompson processing facility could not 
be built as a result of the HPAI outbreak, and therefore the dryer no longer has any value 
to Rembrandt.”). 
193  See id. at *6–9 (analyzing Dahmes’s arguments and providing analysis of both 
parties’ arguments). 
194  In re Cinemex USA Real Estate Holdings, Inc., 2021 WL 564486 (S.D. Fla. 
Jan. 27, 2021). 
195  See id. (frustration of purpose “refers to that condition surrounding the 
contracting parties where one of the parties finds that the purposes for which [it] bargained, 
and which purposes were known to the other party, have been frustrated because of the 
failure of consideration, or impossibility of performance by the other party”). 
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but choose not to do so. Accordingly, no frustration of purpose 
existed. The court rejected the debtor’s argument that opening the 
theaters at 50% capacity coupled with increased costs of providing 
protective gears to employees would generate negative operating 
income and should be covered by the doctrine of frustration of 
purpose.196  
Likewise, in Great New York Automobile Dealers Assn, 
Inc. v. City Spec, LLC, the parties litigated a nonpayment breach 
of a commercial lease contract case, and the court issued a ruling 
in favor of the landlord.197 The tenant asserted a defense of 
frustration of purpose for their nonpayment because of the 
Governor’s Executive Order stating that all non-essential 
businesses must close in person operations due to the COVID-19 
public health crisis. The tenant’s staff could not come to work 
causing frustration of the contract’s purpose.198 The tenant 
requested that the rent be excused. Applying New York contract 
law, the court noted that to establish the frustration of purpose 
defense, a party must prove (1) the frustration must relate to the 
principal purpose of the contract; (2) the frustration must be 
substantial; and (3) the frustrating event must be unforeseen that 
its non-occurrence was the basic assumption of which the contract 
was made.199 The court found the tenant failed to meet the test. 
Specifically, the court found that the tenant services fell within the 
essential services per the Executive Order that the tenant could 
have all their staff to continue in-person operations, but the tenants 
decided not to have the business operate—the tenant “frustrated 
their own purpose.”200 
E. The Duty of Performing in Good Faith 
Under contract law, each party must perform and enforce 
 
196  Id. at *5 (“CB Theater chose not to do so for what appears, based on the Marti 
declaration, to be primarily economic concerns. Therefore CB Theater's performance under 
the Lakeside Lease from June 5, 2020 on is not excused under the doctrine of frustration 
of purpose.”). 
197  Great New York Automobile Dealers Assn, Inc. v. City Spec, LLC, 136 
N.Y.S.3d 695 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. Dec. 29, 2020). 
198  Id. 
199  Id. 
200  Id. 
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the contract in good faith.201 The duty of good faith and fair 
dealing is important in holding the parties to “an implied 
obligation that neither party shall do anything to injure or destroy 
the right of the other party to receive the benefits of the 
agreement.”202 If a party acts in bad faith or engages in inequitable 
conduct in performing its obligations under the contract, the party 
breaches the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.203 
Overall, the duty of good faith and fair dealing is used to 
“effectuate the intentions of the parties or to honor their 
reasonable expectations.”204 The duty does not provide the basis 
for a stand-alone claim; rather, the claim is part of an overall 
breach of contract claim.205  
Demonstrably, in Anadarko Peroleum Corp. v. Noble 
Drilling, the district court found there was violation of the duty of 
good faith and fair dealing by Anadarko. There, Anadarko 
invoked the force majeure clause in the contract when the Mineral 
Management Service of the Department of Interior ordered 
Anadarko to cease drilling on Well No. 2 at Keathley Canyon and 
informed Anadarko about a six month drilling moratorium in the 
Gulf of Mexico.206 The moratorium rendered the contract to drill 
in the Gulf of Mexico impossible as the evidence established that 
Anadarko would incur “substantial, and perhaps excessive and 
impractical costs” if it continued to pursue operations in 
accordance with the contract in the Gulf of Mexico during the 
moratorium period.207 The court ruled for Anadarko’s declaration 
of the force majeure was not done in bad faith.208 Though this 
 
201  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (Am. L. Inst. 1981). 
202  23 Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 63.22 (4th ed. 2020). 
203  See id. See also Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Noble Drilling (U.S.) LLC., 2012 
WL 13040279, 1, 22 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (finding no violation of the duty of good faith and 
fair dealing). 
204  Amoco Oil Co. v. Ervin, 908 P.2d 493, 498 (Colo. 1995). 
205  See Cut-Heal Animal Care Products, Inc. v. Agri-Sales Associates, Inc., 2011 
WL 1563165, *2 (N.D. Tex. 2011). 
206  Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Noble Drilling (U.S.) LLC., supra note 203, 
at *22. 
207  Id. 
208  Id. See also SNB Farms, Inc. v. Swift and Company, 2003 WL 22232881, *5 
(N.D. Iowa, Feb. 7, 2003) (finding that the defendant’s termination of the contract in 
accordance with the contract terms did not violate the duty of good faith and fair dealing). 
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decision did not arise in a pandemic, it is still instructive.209 
In COVID-19-related contract disputes, a party that 
refuses to perform obligations under a contract must adhere to the 
duty of performing the contract in good faith.210 That means if the 
contract contains a force majeure provision, the party invoking the 
provision must establish through evidence that invoking the 
provision is fully supported. Likewise, if the contract does not 
contain a force majeure and the party wishes to rely on the 
doctrine of impossibility to excuse nonperformance, the party 
must demonstrate that its excuse meets the duty of good faith and 
fair dealing. 
For instance, in Su Sung Shin v. Yoon, the plaintiff brought 
a breach of contract against the defendants to recover funds she 
provided for investment in a hotel property of $1.5 million.211 The 
parties settled the case, and the plaintiff attempted to enforce the 
settlement agreement wherein the defendants were to pay the 
plaintiff installment payments.212 The defendants, as the judgment 
debtors, relied on the doctrine of impossibility of performance as 
a defense to non-payments.213 The defendant asserted that due to 
COVID-19, they could not sell the hotel for a sufficient price to 
satisfy the installments.214 The court rejected the defendants’ 
argument because of the fact that the defendants “are currently 
unable to raise the funds necessary to make the two $50,000 
payments due under the Stipulated Judgment; however, this 
obviously does not mean that COVID-19 has “likewise” deprived 
“other persons” of the ability to make $50,000 payments.”215  
Though the court did not explicitly discuss good faith 
 
209  See Pennington v. Continental Resources, Inc., 2019 ND 228, 932 N.W.2d 897, 
902 (“An express force majeure clause in a contract must be accompanied by proof that the 
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performance, the court found that the defendants “have not made 
a showing and cannot make-such as showing” of the impossibility 
defense.216 In other words, the defendants failed both the duty to 
performance of the contract in good faith and the defense of 
impossibility defense.217 These cases provide a roadmap showing 
that if a party has not included a pandemic in the force majeure 
clause in the contract, it must be able to show it met the duty of 
good faith and fair dealing, even though this has not been 
demonstrated by case law as of yet. 
IV. BEYOND THE UNITED STATES’ BORDERS: CHINA’S 
APPROACH TO CONTRACTS UNDER STATE OF 
EMERGENCY LAW 
In China, with many domestic and international contracts, 
the COVID-19 pandemic caused an unprecedented crisis in the 
first half of 2020 because parties could not perform their 
obligations or undertakings under existing contract terms. Chinese 
companies in contracts with international partners for the 
manufacturing and distribution of products and parts in the global 
supply chains network invoked the force majeure clauses to 
protect their businesses when the companies could not fulfill their 
contractual obligations.218 Indeed, as of March 3, 2020, thousands 
of companies insulated themselves from breach of contract 
damages by invoking the force majeure provisions.219 The 
companies together invoked 4,800 contracts with force majeure 
provisions, and in total value, these contracts estimated a 
staggering $53.79 billion dollars.220 
China’s legal system is still evolving with respect to 
contract law. Legal doctrines related to force majeure, 
impossibility, frustration of purpose, duty to perform contracts in 
good faith and fair dealing, mitigation, and damages are not as 
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robust compared to the United States and other nations.221 In terms 
of force majeure, PRC law defines is as objective circumstances 
that cannot be foreseen or avoided and cannot be overcome.222 
Additionally, a party correctly exerting a force majeure clause has 
no obligation to perform or mitigate damages.223 
For domestic contracts, China’s Supreme People’s Court 
issued guidance on judicial interpretations of contracts that 
possesses the legal force as Chinese laws and regulations.224 With 
respect to contracts involving international parties, China instead 
adopted a different approach to address contracts in emergency 
through the authority exerted by the China Council for the 
Promotion of International Trade (the Council).225 China 
continuously used this unusual approach in order to protect its 
domestic companies from feeling the severe economic impact.226 
However, through this “protection,” the Chinese counterparties 
will be “hit by a wave” of unsuspected force majeure certificates, 
which is unheard of between the affairs of private parties.227 
The China Ministry of Commerce and the Council’s local 
branches coordinated their efforts in March 2020 to issue force 
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majeure certificates.228 The Council permits contracting parties 
who are exporters desiring to invoke force majeure provisions to 
excuse performance by applying for force majeure certificates.229 
To obtain the certificate, the applicant only needs to show that 
they are “suffering from circumstances beyond their control.”230 
The threshold requirement is low enabling Chinese exporters to 
meet it with ease.231 In addition, the certificates are available to 
both companies with executed contracts and “companies that have 
failed to execute their contracts on time or have not been able to 
execute their international trade contracts are entitled to apply for 
the certificates.”232 
The Council holds the authority to swiftly determine and 
issue a force majeure certificate. In fact, by March 11, 2020, the 
Council issued 5,637 force majeure certificates to companies in 
China affected by COVID-19, and these certificates represented 
contracts in total value of $72.47 billion dollars.233 By issuing the 
force majeure certificates, the Council reduced the losses incurred 
by the companies during the peak of the pandemic.234 The Council 
claims that the force majeure certificates are recognized by “more 
than 200 countries and regions.”235 
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By allowing the Council to issue the force majeure 
certificates to breaching parties, China expeditiously addressed 
contract nonperformance in the state of emergency. The issuance 
insures certainty, in addition to efficiency, but there are several 
problems with China’s approach.236  
The Council, acting as an administrative agency, renders 
decisions that are the equivalence of redrafting thousands of 
contracts that have been bargained for and entered into by the 
parties. The Council possesses the extraordinary power of 
revisions that contracting parties, particularly, international 
parties neither know nor accept. These revisions go against the 
very foundation of contract law–the power of the two parties to 
contract privately and as they see fit. The Council’s conduct 
intimates a level of coercion when a quasi-administrative body 
unilaterally rewrites or introduces new terms to negotiated 
contracts. Further, the swiftness of the issuance suggests that the 
Council does not carefully analyze the force majeure provisions. 
As shown in preceding sections on contract norms, interpretating 
force majeure provisions is not a simple process in breach of 
contract and nonperformance law. Even if each of these contracts 
are solved amicably, the litigation involved will be messy, and it 
will take time to address each case.237 In addition, invoking force 
majeure alone does not automatically relieve the invoking party 
with the provision from contractual liability because contract law 
requires the breaching party to prove that the COVID-19 
supervening events specifically cause the contract 
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nonperformance, and the party has taken steps to mitigate 
damages.238 Overall, the Council’s issuances of the force majeure 
certificates serve as shields to protect Chinese companies at the 
expense of the other parties in the global supplies network.239 
Even though the certificates are likely to protect these Chinese 
companies, there will be international consequences on the 
opposing parties; the “spillover” effects will punish other 
countries that are not at fault for the pandemic’s effect on these 
contracts.240 
CONCLUSION 
Contracts are relationships between parties. Through a 
long and storied history of development, contract law percolates 
to reflect how parties handle emergencies caused by deaths, wars, 
epidemics, and government actions. These doctrines prevent 
governments, either the judicial or executive branch, to rewrite the 
contracts. Though in the time of the pandemic, some governments 
may prefer expediency to rewrite contracts for the parties. The 
short-term action, however, undermines the core principles 
underlying the freedom to contract that parties have bargained for 
when they enter contracts. Government interventions, in the name 
of certainty and expediency, actually may cause uncertainty and 
generate mistrust in future contracts and undermine the resiliency 
of contract law as emergency law. Parties are best served to 
anticipate future pandemic and government actions by drafting 
better contracts to reflect the new normal. 
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